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INTRODUCTION
2011 was an eventful year for those interested in patent law. In March,
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") released a report that urges the Pa-
tent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and courts to remedy perceived
inadequacies underlying the U.S. patent system.' The FTC observes that
people of skill in the art routinely encounter difficulty in determining the
meaning, and hence exclusive scope, of a patent's claims. Not only does this
failure of notice stymie the efficient dispersion of technology throughout the
economy, the FTC argues, but the judicial process can aggravate the prob-
lem by granting inappropriate remedies in patent-infringement cases.2 Then,
in September, Congress passed comprehensive patent-reform legislation for
the first time in almost sixty years.3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(the "AIA") changed the patent landscape in a number of significant ways,
introducing a first-to-file system, post-grant opposition proceedings, certain
prior-user rights, and other material changes.'
These developments are remarkable, not least because they arrived at
a time when some considered legislative reform of the patent system to be
both unlikely and ineffective.' Skepticism about such reform was far from
surprising, as commentators cannot even agree whether the patent system,
as a whole, spurs or hinders innovation in the U.S. economy.' Yet, alt-
hough many academics and people in industry perceive the patent regime
to be in crisis,' the system's specific, problematic features have eluded
universal definition.' Observers also disagree about the magnitude of the
harm associated with various controversial features of the patent regime.9
1. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT No-
TICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/1 10307patentreport.pdf.
2. Id. at passim.
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (exploring problems with the patent system, arguing that the
courts are best placed to resolve those difficulties, and outlining ways in which the judiciary
might accomplish the same).
6. Compare, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (2008) (advocating the abolition of the patent system), and JAMES BRESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (exploring problems with the contemporary patent system), with
Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D.. 38 IDEA 529
(1998) (advocating a strong patent regime).
7. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1747,
1747 (2011) ("There is widespread agreement that the patent system in the United States is in
need of reform.").
8. See, e.g., Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The 'Experimental Use' Exception
Through a Developmental Lens, 50 IDEA 831, 835 (2010).
9. See, e.g., James F. McDonough Ill. Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189,
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As a result, little consensus had emerged as to the contours of an effective,
comprehensive solution. 0 The AIA and the FTC Report mark a welcome
point of departure from this pre-existing trend of disagreement and discord.
As between the two developments, the AIA is likely to overshadow the
FTC Report. Yet, due in part to the fact that the AIA does little to address
the problem of inadequate patent notice, the Report is itself of considerable
importance. This Essay explores the backdrop, substantive provisions, and
likely impact of the Report, concluding that the FTC's recommendations,
though generally well founded, are unlikely in themselves to resolve the
most worrying features of the patent crisis.
This Essay argues that the FTC proposals are excessively restrained
with respect to controversial tenets of proposed reform, though they are ap-
propriately ambitious in other quarters. The agency takes care to distinguish
patent-assertion entities ("PAEs"), which eschew commercialization and
engage only in ex post technology licensing, from other non-practicing enti-
ties, such as universities and semiconductor-design firms, which actively
disseminate their technology ex ante to third parties that commercialize the
technology." The FTC urges courts to be sensitive to the innovation-reducing
conduct of the former group of patentees, contrasting their activities with the
welfare-enhancing practices of inventors that engage in ex ante technology
transfer.12 Among its bolder provisions, the Report calls on the International
Trade Commission ("ITC") to deny exclusion and cease-and-desist orders to
prevailing PAEs.13 In making this recommendation, the FTC seeks to close a
loophole in the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay, Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L.C., which held that the law does not automatically entitle
patentees to injunctive relief in the event of established infringement. 4 That
loophole effectively enables certain patentees to obtain injunctive relief
from the ITC in circumstances where they could not do so through the
courts.
Outside the realm of the ITC, the Report advises judges to be mindful of
the economic costs of utilizing property rules in lieu of liability rules in cases
of hold out, and to employ the four-factor test in equity for an injunction in
194-95 (2006) (articulating the counter-majoritarian view that a patent-troll problem does not
exist); Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 595 (2008) (arguing
for expansive patentable subject matter in contrast to academics who argue that fields of inno-
vation such as business methods, computer software, and gene sequences should not be
subject to patent protection).
10. Compare, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5 (arguing that the judiciary should
take the lead in solving the patent crisis), with Scott Baker, Can the Courts Rescue Us from
the Patent Crisis?, 88 TEX. L. REV. 593, 609 (2010) (questioning whether the courts can serve
the role that Professors Burk and Lemley envision).
11. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 31-72.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 239-43.
14. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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light of those costs.' 5 More generally, the Report asks courts to introduce
more-rigorous economic analysis into damages determinations in patent
cases, urging renewed focus in particular on the hypothetical-negotiation
framework for determining damages.16 It also urges the judiciary to jettison
the entire-market-value rule and dual awards, both of which are inconsistent
with economic theory." Lastly, the FTC articulates a variety of proposals
aimed at ameliorating the current situation in which many patents, especial-
ly in the information-technology sector, fail to disclose useful information
concerning both the contours of the relevant patents' scope and the nature of
the claimed technology.'I
The Report represents an important development in U.S. innovation pol-
icy. This Essay explores the material features of the patent crisis and
explains the crucial roles that patent notice and remedies play in fueling the
crisis. It examines the Report's probable efficacy, laudable provisions, and
material shortcomings. The Essay concludes that, although the Report's rec-
ommendations are generally well founded, the Report is unlikely to have a
major impact on the patent system's most significant problems. It thus ap-
pears likely that more significant reforms will be necessary.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly recounts the controversial
features of the patent system that lead some commentators to believe that
the patent system is in crisis. Part II explores the interrelated functions of
notice and remedies by comparing the laws of tangible and intellectual
property. Drawing on that discussion, Part III addresses the Report's most
notable recommendations and singles out a subset of them for particular
praise. Part IV details the Report's limitations, opining that its decision not
to make formal recommendations with respect to the most contested, but
arguably most important, aspects of the patent system means that the Report
is unlikely to have more than a modest impact on the crisis. Part IV also
discusses technical deficiencies that underlie the FTC's analysis. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. THE PATENT CRISIS
One must view the FTC's recommendations in the context of the crisis
that the agency seeks to address. The controversial features of the patent
system are well known. The fact that inventors are motivated by divergent
15. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 213-44. The four-factor test for obtaining an injunc-
tion is: (1) irreparable injury; (2) inadequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardships
favors granting an injunction; and (4) granting an injunction would serve the public interest.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
16. Id. at 159-76; see infra text accompanying notes 169-171.
17. Id. at 154-58; see infra text accompanying notes 154-155, 172.
18. Id. at73-136.
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incentives poses a challenge to those who seek to foster innovation." As the
relationship between patents and innovation differs dramatically from indus-
try to industry, features of the patent system that are problematic in some
quarters are desirable in others.20 As a result, proposed solutions to per-
ceived frailties in the system invariably attract protest from stakeholders
who favor the status quo, which can stymie effective reform.21 As but one
example, the argument that courts should liberally grant injunctive relief in
the event of established infringement found favor in the pharmaceutical
industry, but invoked the ire of companies in the information-technology
industry that commercialize technology. 22 Consensus remained elusive for
some time.23 An important exception, of course, occurred in September
2011 when, after several years of failed attempts, Congress passed patent-
reform legislation in the form of the AIA.24
That shortcomings in the patent regime have emerged should hardly be
surprising. Conceived in a time when mechanical devices were a central
component of industrial innovation and when marketed products rarely in-
corporated more than a modest number of patent-eligible technologies, 25 the
patent regime has since ballooned to encompass such exotic subjects as bio-
technology, nanotechnology, computer software, semiconductors, and
telecommunications. 26 Few would think that a twenty-year exclusive right
would consistently impart efficient incentives over such an eclectic range of
industries, and yet a one-size-fits-all system continues to prevail.27
19. See Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incen-
tives, 50 IDEA 723, 736-40 (2010).
20. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1615-30 (2003).
21. See William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target:
The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 153, 153 n.10 (2009) (citing Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist
Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. POt'Y 587 (2006)) ("Professor
Cahoy urges an incrementalist approach to patent reform because, in his view, the complexity
of the patent system combined with reasonable disagreement over the system's most im-
portant goals and ambiguity regarding the economic incentives, dooms comprehensive
legislative reform efforts to failure.").
22. Compare Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing of America as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006) (No. 05-130), with Brief for Business Software Alliance, et al. as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
23. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 95-100.
24. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341
(2011).
25. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 38; Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94
IOWA L. REv. 539, 574 n.152 (2009); Sarah A. Geers, Comment, Common Sense and the Fact
Finder Without Skill in the Art: The Role of Objective Evidence in Achieving Proper Technol-
ogy Specificity, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 257 (2010).
26. See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1762.
27. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, Ill COLUM. L. REV.
207, 223 (2011) ("At present, our patent system is predicated on a binary, one-size-fits-all,
543Spring 2012]1
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The policy challenges that have arisen are industry specific, with the
most severe crisis in information technology ("IT"). The larger field of IT
includes computer hardware and software, database design and applications,
and telecommunications.2 Many of the products in this field combine
hundreds, even thousands, of discrete, patent-eligible technologies.2 9 As the
rights to these constituent technologies are fragmented, anticommons
effects-which occur when one must aggregate many separate property
rights to market a technological product, and are most likely to arise when
the PTO awards a large number of narrow patents over discrete
technologies-can result. These anticommons effects create high transaction
costs that frustrate ex ante bargaining and commercialization.30 The
amorphous language often used to claim IT inventions, facilitated by the
Federal Circuit's lax disclosure requirements, compounds the problem by
creating a thicket that allows multiple parties to lay claim to the same
technology." The thicket effect also magnifies transaction costs. To make
matters worse, the overwhelmed PTO routinely issues patents that do not
meet the novelty, nonobviousness, or enablement conditions of patentability,
resulting in patents asserted in the marketplace that would not withstand
scrutiny in court.32
The sheer volume of IT patents, many of which are of dubious quality
and indiscernible meaning, has created a bizarre phenomenon: companies
that manufacture IT products routinely ignore patents and independently
develop requisite technologies themselves.33 Meanwhile, a large secondary
market for IT patents has developed in which specialized entities acquire
patents not to obtain technology to include in marketed products, but simply
to bring infringement actions against companies that sell goods to consum-
ers.34 Many policymakers condemn these "patent trolls" for contributing
nothing to consumers and for instead creating a tax on the welfare-
design."); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 79 92 (explaining how different theo-
ries of innovation may affect different industries).
28. See Linda M. Beale, Is Bilski Likely the Final Word on Tax Strategy Patents? Co-
herence Matters, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 110, 116 (2009).
29. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007) ("In the information technology sector in particular, modern prod-
ucts such as microprocessors, cell phones, or memory devices can easily be covered by dozens
or even hundreds of different patents.").
30. See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1757 (2007).
31. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and
Standard-Setting, in I INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119-26 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds., 2001).
32. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46-51 (2007).
33. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19,22.
34. See Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 115,
117-18 (2011); see also Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009).
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promoting technology commercialization of others.35 For this criticism to be
accurate, however, one must distinguish between two forms of "non-
practicing entities" ("NPEs"). First, there are NPEs that license patents ex
ante to companies that employ the relevant technology in designing and
manufacturing goods for downstream consumption. Such laudable NPEs
include universities and technology start-ups.36 Other NPEs, however, add
little or nothing to ex ante commercialization of technology, but instead ini-
tiate infringement proceedings after infringing sales have taken place. 37 As
such ex post actions occur after investment in and development of a new
product, the NPE has greater leverage to extract greater royalties than it
could have obtained ex ante.
NPEs of the latter sort, which Professor Colleen Chien aptly named
"patent assertion entities" 38 ("PAEs"), justify their business model by argu-
ing that they create a market for inventors who would otherwise lack
opportunities to sell their technological discoveries. Empirical evidence
does reveal that IT manufacturers display little interest in patents if their
owners have engaged in little or no post-grant development. 39 To the extent
that individual or other inventors have limited access to capital, the absence
of a market for their technologies deprives them of a financial return. Such
inventors, PAEs claim, also lack the requisite capital to assert their intellec-
tual property ("IP") rights in court given the formidable costs of patent
litigation.4 0
Nevertheless, these facts do not justify the conduct of PAEs. Not only
do IT patents offer notoriously poor disclosure, but also many IT companies
actively ignore patents and consistently engage in independent invention.4'
As a result, the welfare benefits associated with the PAE business model are
dubious. By providing a market for IT patents that does not require devel-
opment sufficient to demonstrate commercial viability, and by failing to
transform acquired rights into sold products, PAEs may simply be fueling a
"patent bubble." PAEs may spur the generation of many IT patents, but few
35. See Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENv. U. L. REv. 199, 201 (2006) (de-
scribing such criticism).
36. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629 (2008) (explaining that, although universities are non-
practicing entities, they are not patent trolls because "most university licenses have a major
technology transfer component"); see also Leslie T. Grab, Equitable Concerns of eBay v.
MercExchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent Protection Against Pa-
tent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 82 (2006).
37. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
38. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosys-
tem and its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010).
39. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 69-70.
40. See Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Non-
Practicing Entities, I10 CoLUM. L. REV. 114, 126-30 (2010).
41. See Lemley, supra note 33, at 22.
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of these are likely to enhance consumer welfare. Meanwhile, firms that mar-
ket IT products have had to undertake costly measures to defend themselves.
For example, commercializing firms have enlisted the services of defensive
patent aggregators that purchase patents to prevent NPEs from later assert-
ing them. 42
Beyond the problems of PAEs, indeterminate claim language, question-
able patent validity, and illusory disclosure requirements in IT industries,
numerous commentators have railed against computer software and business
method patents, contending that inventors enjoy sufficient incentives inde-
pendent of the patent system to develop these technologies. 43 The rapid rate
of technological advancement in these settings, the disproportionate im-
portance of cumulative innovation, the non-self-disclosing nature of these
inventions, and (in the case of software) the presence of copyright protection
counsel against patent eligibility. In these contexts, too, the norm is for
inventors to ignore patents and to innovate independently. First-mover ad-
vantage, bolstered by trade secret protection and amplified by network
effects, appears to be the principal driver of innovation in these settings.4
Collectively, these traits paint a picture of a patent system adrift. The
economic justification for patent awards rests on public goods theory, which
teaches that scientific knowledge is vulnerable to third-party appropriation.
Specifically, public goods refer to goods (often ideas) that are nonexcluda-
ble, as it is difficult to prevent others from consuming them, and
nonrivalrous in consumption, which means that a person's consumption of
the resource does not detract from the consumption of others. 45 If competi-
tors can readily reverse engineer an inventor's technology, the latter will
lack an incentive to invest in research and development ("R&D"). Remarka-
bly, fewer than eleven percent of patent-infringement complaints even allege
copying.46 As a result, the contemporary patent system has taken on a life
independent of its economic mandate. An IP regime that principally operates
as a tax on independent invention rests on dubious economic footing.47
42. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67.
43. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protec-
tion for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L. 1025,
1029-30 (1990); see also Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897 (2009).
44. See, e.g., Siddharth Khanijou, Patent Inequity? Rethinking the Application of Strict
Liability to Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 179, 190 n1.58
(2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, What if There Were a Business Method Use Exemption to
Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 249-50.
45. See, e.g., Rita Heimes, Trademarks, Identity, and Justice, II J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 133, 139 (2011).
46. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1421 (2009).
47. Economic theory might nevertheless approve of a patent system on the ground
that it creates an incentive to commercialize. Although patents play a crucial role in this
respect in industries that involve high levels of capital expenditures on post-invention
product development-paradigmatically, the biopharmaceutical industries-in others fields,
546 [Vol. 18:539
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Separately, patent breadth may be excessive in some industrial settings. 48
Economic theory justifies the grant of a broad exclusive right on the ground
that the original inventor can best guide the path of his technology.49 This
"prospect theory" of patents contends that granting a party an exclusive
right-that is, a prospect-over an idea or invention will spur that entity to
extract the value of that idea, to commercialize the same into a marketable
product, and to guide any improvements over the technology, if necessary via
third parties that have the ability and inclination to do so. 5 0 In this respect,
prospect theory comports with the Coase Theorem, which states that, in zero-
transaction-cost environments, the initial allocation of property rights will
have no effect on efficiency."' Prospect theory, however, loses force when fol-
low-on innovation is rapid, of greater value than the initial invention, and
entails the efforts of many separate parties. 52 In such settings, transaction costs
will be high, and so society cannot be confident that initial inventors in whom
the law bestows prospect rights will efficiently contract with third-party im-
provers. The inventions of IT companies display these traits, suggesting that
exclusive rights in this field, if awarded at all, should be narrow.5
These problems are sufficiently severe to lead one to question the legit-
imacy of the patent system itself. Recent studies suggest that patents' net
effect in certain fields, especially IT, may act as a drain on innovation, oper-
ating in opposition to the patent regime's raison d'tre.54 This quagmire has
led some economists to call for the abolition of the patent system." Other
less radical possibilities include introducing an independent-invention de-
fense56 or broad prior-user rights (which the AIA has partially done).5 1 Other
and especially IT, patents play only a modest role, at best, in spurring commercialization. See
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 38-46.
48. See, e.g., Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, Thirty-Two Short Stories About Intel-
lectual Property, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 42 (2011); Oscar Liivak, Maintaining
Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 177,
222 (2007).
49. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
EcON. 265 (1977) (introducing the famous "prospect theory" of patents).
50. See id.; see also John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 439, 486-91 (2004).
51. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 64-66 (8th ed. 2011).
52. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 72, 92.
53. See id. at 156-70.
54. See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intel-
lectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or
Not) 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000); see also Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 18
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987).
55. See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 6.
56. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention
Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 EcONOMICA 535 (2002); Samson Vermont, Independent
Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REv. 475, 479 (2006).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2011); See Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 92 (2006).
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possibilities include co-ownership of an initial inventor's patent,58 restricting
the scope of patentable subject matter,59 curtailing damage awards,o or
narrowing patent rights by increasing disclosure requirements, which would
more closely align the reach of a patent's claims with the technology re-
vealed by the specification. 6'
Despite these difficulties, one must exercise caution in addressing the
problems facing the patent regime. Although patents operate as an imperfect
driver of innovation, they serve a vital function in some critical areas of the
economy. The biopharmaceutical and chemical industries, in particular, de-
pend on the patent regime for their survival and are sensitive to that system's
operation, as the 2011 "patent cliff' demonstrates. 62 Although these fields
are not devoid of problems, economists generally agree that patents work
well within them and are indeed an essential prerequisite of ongoing innova-
tion. 63 Controversial issues in these fields tend not to question the legitimacy
of patent protection. Instead, concerns implicate the optimal structure of
patent protection in light of such complementary policy tools as Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") regulatory exclusivity,' the availability of
prizes,6 5 and government funding for medical research. 66 An exception to the
58. See John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, Ill YALE
L.J. 2251 (2002).
59. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 231 (2009).
60. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law,
89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 132-34 (2009).
61. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 25; Michael J. Walsh, Comment, The Disclosure
Requirements of 35 U.S.C. . 112 and Software-Related Patent Applications: Debugging the
System, 18 CONN. L. REV. 855, 872-74 (1986). But see Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Soft-
ware Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of
Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 234-37 (2009).
62. See Buying Time: Will Swallowing Wyeth Cure Pfizer?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31,
2009, at 77. Indeed, breakthrough drug innovation has stalled in recent years, as the number of
new molecular entities (NMEs) approved by the FDA has dropped off. The government has
responded in a variety of ways, including by making permanent a tax credit for R&D and by
creating a one billion dollar center run by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to help pro-
mote initial discoveries into viable targets worthy of commercial development by private
pharmaceutical companies. See Jeremy Hsu, U.S. Rolls the Dice on Pharmaceutical Drug
Innovation, INNOVATIONNEwsDAILY (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/
203-nih-translational-center-pharmaceutical-drugs-innovation.html.
63. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REv. 503, 507-08 (2009).
64. See, e.g., Andrew J. Paprocki, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
Can the Patent Term Extension of the Hatch Waxman Act Be Used as Leverage in Drug Pa-
tent Infringement Settlements?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 471, 485-86 (2006); Sarah Sorscher, Note,
A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the Implications of Data Exclusivity as a
Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 285 (2009).
65. See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for
New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 525 (2001).
66. See Joel West, Policy Challenges of Open, Cumulative, and User Innovation, 30
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 29-33 (2009).
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accepted propriety of patents in the biopharmaceutical field, beyond the
usual objection to monopoly pricing of life-saving drugs, concerns ethical
opposition to gene patents, in particular.67
Some academics claim that anticommons effects may extend beyond
the telecommunications, computer-software, and semiconductor industries
to biotechnology.68 They worry that biotech researchers experience Cournot-
complements problems-that is, problems associated with having to
aggregate large numbers of narrow rights that are collectively required to
achieve a larger purpose-because those holding gene patents upstream may
hinder downstream uses by refusing to license." The Federal Circuit's de-
manding disclosure requirements over gene patents, which limit claims to
the sequence or structure actually disclosed, add to the danger by creating a
large number of narrow rights that downstream users may need to combine
in order to innovate.70 Nevertheless, empirical evidence to date suggests that
anticommons effects, if they exist, are not significant, if only because of a
culture of nonenforcement in the research setting.7' Furthermore, and not-
withstanding this concern, there is no question that patents are an important
component of innovation in the biotechnology industry given its risk-filled
and capital-intensive R&D profile.72
Construing the preceding spheres of innovation on a collective basis,
one can appreciate the challenges currently facing policymakers in the pa-
tent field. Due to the patent system's one-size-fits-all nature, changes in
patent doctrine and practice designed to induce favorable consequences in
problem hot spots such as IT may have pernicious effects elsewhere.73
67. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
68. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). Empirical evidence of
anticommons effect in biotechnology, however, has been lacking. See John P. Walsh, Ashish
Arora, & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021
(2003); see also Fiona Murray & Scott Stem, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder
the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis,
63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648 (2007).
69. See David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 219 (2004).
70. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002); Steven Carlson & Lauren Murphy Pringle, High
Hurdles for Biotechnology Patents: The Written Description, 4 INDus. BIOTECHNOLOGY 337
(2008).
71. See Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.L.
Sci. & TECH. 629, 659 (2010).
72. See Stifling or Stimulating-The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic
Testing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 59 (2007) (prepared statement of Jeffrey P.
Kushan on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry Organization); Jay P. Kesan, Transferring
Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2169, 2195 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Infonnation Processing Patent, 14 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 37 (2008).
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It is against this background that the FTC released its March 2011 Re-
port on patent law and competition. The Report does not attempt to address
the full panoply of problems afflicting the patent system, but instead takes
aim at two major components of the current dilemma: patent notice and
damages. It advocates a series of notable recommendations for improve-
ment, though, as this Essay points out, the Report is most notable for what it
does not recommend.
II. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF NOTICE AND REMEDIES
WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY RIGHTS
The FTC's 2011 Report does not target the full array of deficiencies af-
flicting the patent system. Instead, it addresses the more circumscribed
issues of notice and optimal remedies in the event of infringement. Why are
these fitting subjects of analysis? Perhaps counterintuitively, it is illuminat-
ing to examine the law of tangible property and the economic principles that
underlie the same. 74
To undertake this comparative analysis, we must first understand why
we, as a society, recognize property rights over physical objects. Economists
advance the following exposition: first, property rights induce owners to
devote scarce resources to improving land and physical objects by reducing
(though not eliminating) third-party appropriation of the relevant benefits.75
Second, property rights permit scarce resources to move efficiently from
lower- to higher-value uses as measured by people's willingness to pay.76
The property system governing realty and personalty (that is, land and
personal property) works well for at least two reasons. First, property rights
are well defined. One can readily determine the metes and bounds of one's
ownership of land. Even though uncertainty may occasionally arise regard-
ing precise boundaries and lead to potential disputes, the extent of any
uncertainty is typically limited. 7 Second, although divided ownership is
possible, those who hold freehold or leasehold interests in a particular piece
of property are typically few in number. It is therefore usually straightfor-
ward to identify who owns a piece of property." These attributes are
important because they facilitate efficient use of market mechanisms, which
74. For the author's broader discussion on the relationship between physical and intel-
lectual property, see Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation, 28 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 61 (2009).
75. See POSNER, supra note 51, at 40-42.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 746 (2007).
78. Cf Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Pri-
vate Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1462-63 (1996).
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permit Pareto-superior bargaining, 79 create legal certainty, and obviate the
need to resort to the costly and error-filled judicial process ex post.
To move from the tangible to intellectual domain, consider why the law
creates property rights in information and technology through the patent
system. The reasons are closely related to the justification for such rights in
real and personal property. First, exclusivity enables inventors to limit third-
party appropriation of knowledge.80 This function is particularly important
in the intellectual realm. The free-riding problem is acute with respect to
technology that exhibits public-good characteristics 1 because it is harder to
maintain exclusive control over the use of an idea than it is to guard the bor-
ders of one's land.82 Second, as with land and physical goods, information
may be more valuable in some hands than others, and so property rights
facilitate technology transfer consistent with the Coase Theorem.83
How well does this patent system work? It certainly does not work as
well as the exclusive rights that govern traditional property. The extent of
the shortcoming, however, depends on the context. Deficiencies in the patent
system arise where the conditions accompanying a patent grant differ from
those accompanying traditional property rights. The patent system works
best when the conditions underlying a patent grant are similar to those that
underlie exclusive rights over physical resources. The system works least
well when the differences are most pronounced.
Consider the pharmaceutical field, which is a paradigm for successful
application of the patent system. Why do patents work well in this field?
First, property rights are well defined because a claimed chemical structure
has a defined meaning to one skilled in the art.' Furthermore, pharmaceuti-
cal products are subject to a small number of patents. An inventor of a new
79. Pareto-superior bargains make at least some parties better off-that is, the arrange-
ments satisfy the benefitted parties' preferences-without leaving any party worse off. See
POSNER, supra note 51, at 17.
80. Id. at 48.
81. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (2005).
82. Hence the mantra: "information wants to be free." See R. Polk Wagner, Information
Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
995 (2003).
83. This observation, however, comes with an important caveat. Specifically, the fact
that technology is nonrivalrous in consumption means that, subject to the constraint of main-
taining incentives to invent, improve, and commercialize, the law should make technological
know-how freely available to all. In this respect, the economic function of the patent system in
facilitating efficient allocation of ownership rights over technology is legitimate only insofar
as exclusivity is necessary to impart desirable incentives.
84. However, biologic drugs also involve structures that people skilled in the art have
difficulty defining, which has led some to argue that inventors should employ process-based
limitations to ensure that patented biologics meet the enablement requirements of Section 112.
See Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Bio-
technology's Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS ScI. & TECH. L.J.
109 (2011).
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chemical entity will invariably obtain a drug substance patent covering the
active pharmaceutical ingredient, and may seek further protection in the
form of drug product and method-of-use patents. 85 These rarely account,
however, for more than a few patents over a single drug.86
In contrast, consider IT industries where property rights, as defined by
the claims, are amorphous and indeterminate.8 7 Furthermore, a single IT
product may use thousands of patented inventions.88 These traits lie at the
opposite end of the spectrum from the traits typically attendant on property
grants over physical resources. Thus, it is unsurprising that a system of pri-
vate ownership rights over IT technologies operates imperfectly.8 9
It is clear that notice is a principal factor in explaining the widely vary-
ing impact of patents on innovation. When parties interested in a resource
can determine the scope of that resource as easily as the owner of the re-
source, ex ante bargaining is both feasible and cost-effective. When the
borders of an ownership right are vague, however, and especially when mul-
tiple parties lay claim to that right, significant transaction costs can frustrate
bargaining. These principles underlie both tangible and intellectual property.
A number of important fields of commercial innovation subject to the
patent system experience significant notice problems. A "patent thicket" has
emerged in IT because vague claims make it difficult to determine the
boundaries of a claimed invention.90 As a result, overlapping rights routinely
claim the same technology.91 This phenomenon arises not only from vague
claim language, but also from weak disclosure rules that permit inventors to
claim more than what they actually invented.92 Also in IT, one encounters
85. Pharmaceutical companies have engaged in so-called "evergreening" practices by
obtaining new drug product patents over reformulations or different methods of use, some-
times in a bid to frustrate generic competition. See, e.g., Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay
Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharma-
ceutical Patent Litigation, Ill CotuM. L. REv. 1788, 1789 (2011).
86. See Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Patent Damages, 2 LANDSLIDE 37,
37-38 (2010); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make A
Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 299, 300 (2010).
87. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 5, 157.
88. See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Holdup of Standards (And One Not
to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007).
89. There is a consensus among economists that the patent system is far more effective
in the pharmaceutical setting than it is in the sphere of IT. Indeed, recent studies suggest that
IT patents may affirmatively depress innovation. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Such a phenomenon is a remarkable indictment of an exclusive rights system that accepts the
social costs associated with monopoly for the larger gain achieved in spurring research, devel-
opment, and the commercialization of technology. Id.
90. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 627, 640 (2010).
91. See id. at 641.
92. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, IP and Antitrust: Refonnation and Hann, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 905, 951 (2010). Stricter disclosure requirements under Section 112 limit patent scope
by preventing inventors from using broad claim language that conceivably embraces products
552 [Vol. 18:539
Impmving Patent Notice and Remedies
anticommons effects, which result when a large number of fragmented
rights are necessary components of a final downstream product. This causes
a Cournot-complements problem, as a company wishing to market a product
must seek permission from a large number of separate owners in order to do
so. 93 Economic theory reveals that separate ownership of complements cre-
ates inefficiencies as each owner sets a private-profit-maximizing price that
fails to account for the fact that lowering prices increases demand for com-
plementary products. 94 Fragmented ownership thus leads to lower output
and higher prices downstream, which is why vertical integration is often
desirable. 95
Thicket effects, which arise in significant part from inadequate notice,96
as well as anticommons problems, stymie ex ante bargaining. This causes
many companies either to abandon commercial projects or to ignore patents
and worry about infringement proceedings later.97 Inadequate notice is the
principal culprit; hence, the importance of the FTC's Report is clear.
If poor notice feeds high transaction costs, and improving the notice
function is not feasible, what can policymakers do? In answering this ques-
tion, traditional property law is illuminating because it employs separate
remedies in the event of unauthorized incursions upon exclusive rights.
Courts typically use a property rule, which grants an owner an unfettered
right to exclude-that is, an automatic right to injunctive relief.98 As a mat-
ter of economic theory, such relief is likely to be appropriate where the legal
rights and identities of the relevant parties are clear.99 In such cases, an au-
tomatic right to an injunction induces prospective licensees to obtain a
or processes far removed from the written description of the claimed invention contained in
the patent specification. Id.
93. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses,
34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1160 (2009).
94. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 927 (1979).
95. See Pietro Crocioni, Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging Markets: A Review
of Cases, Literature, and a Suggested Framework, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 449, 458
n.18 (2008).
96. See Amit Makker, Note, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Com-
mercialization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (2011); Allen K. Yu, Why It Might Be Time to
Eliminate Genomic Patents, Together with the Natural Extracts Doctrine Supporting Such
Patents, 47 IDEA 659, 674 n.65 (2007).
97. See Amy Yancey & C. Neal Stewart, Jr., Are University Researchers at Risk for
Patent Infringement?, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 1225, 1225 (2007).
98. For the classic discussion of the economics of property vis-A-vis liability rules, see
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
99. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1782
(2004); see also Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Prop-
erty Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2097 (1997). But cf Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MIcH. L. REV. 1285 (2008) (ar-
guing that property rules can incentivize excessive expenditures in ascertaining the scope of
legal rights).
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license ex ante. According to traditional law and economics theory, this is
desirable because it induces parties to avail themselves of market
mechanisms in low-transaction-cost settings.'00 These coordination benefits
contrast with the costly and potentially error-prone ex post proceedings in
court that are necessitated by liability rules.
Nevertheless, and instructively, the law occasionally employs a liability
rule in the event of a violation of a person's exclusive rights. This remedy
denies a property owner the legal right to exclude, instead allowing third
parties to freely intrude upon another's property so long as they pay the rel-
evant access fee set by a third party.'o' Usually, that fee translates to
damages awarded by another court. Other things being equal, in high trans-
action cost settings, liability rules are superior because the associated
litigation costs are less than the cost of using market mechanisms ex ante.'02
More recent scholarship has revealed, however, that the normative
quality of liability versus property rules is more complex than orthodox
theory suggested. In particular, the question of whether property or liability
rules are optimal in a given case depends on not only the level of transaction
costs, but also the level of judicial-error costs. 03 Indeed, in certain cases,
conditions that create preclusive transaction costs, which suggest the propri-
ety of a liability rule, can also stymie judicial efforts to calculate optimal
damages, thus rendering both rules inefficient.'" Law and economics schol-
ars have also suggested that a liability rule may be desirable in situations of
asymmetric information because it creates greater incentives for parties to
divulge private information than would a property rule. 0 This last view
may justify the use of liability rules in low transaction cost settings where
private information creates the potential for strategic behavior. As others
have pointed out, however, this is most likely to be the case with respect to
contractual bargaining rather than property-based disputes between relative
strangers. 106
Importantly, it is not the case that traditional property law always uses
property rules. Nuisance is the classic example in which victims may obtain
damages but not an injunction.0 7 Transaction costs in such settings are high
100. See PoSNER, supra note 51.
101. See Smith, supra note 99, at 1720.
102. See Sterk, supra note 99, at 1295 ("The existing literature, thus, suggests that what-
ever advantages liability rules might have in overcoming ex post strategic bargaining are
generally overwhelmed by the ex ante advantages that property rules generate.").
103. See id. at 1290-91.
104. Id.
105. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE LJ. 1027 (1995).
106. See Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 16
(2011).
107. See Spur Inds., Inc. v. Del. E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972); Boomer
v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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due to the large number of parties involved.'o In related fashion, the law
creates reciprocal easements for low-level interference with others' land,
such as moderate music and conversations that transcend a person's property
to affect a neighbor's property.'" Perhaps the most illuminative example
involves the power of eminent domain, which allows the government to ap-
propriate private property without obtaining the owner's permission so long
as it pays compensation equal to the market value of the property." 10 The
danger of ex post hold out justifies this ostensibly draconian rule."'
Consistent with these principles, economic theory suggests that the op-
timal remedy in the event of patent infringement depends intimately on the
transaction costs at issue, where those costs comprise identification costs,
the number of potential parties, and the certainty of ownership rights. In
situations where notice is clear, where the number of rights over the relevant
resource is limited, and where one can readily identify the relevant owners,
transaction costs are low and so the law should induce parties to avail of the
market. Injunctive relief is therefore appropriate with respect to biopharma-
ceuticals, chemicals, and mechanical devices." 2 Conversely, where
significant transaction costs exist due to the indeterminate nature of patents'
scope and the preclusive number of patents that either lay claim to the same
technology or to the many constituent parts of the ultimate product, courts
should be cautious in granting injunctions. The opportunity to shut down an
infringer's operations allows a patentee credibly to extract value beyond the
technological contribution of the relevant invention. For the same reason
that property owners cannot prevent government appropriation through the
power of eminent domain, so courts should not necessarily allow patentees,
e.g., PAEs, to enjoin an infringer's operations when the infringer had no
opportunity to negotiate a license ex ante."'
108. See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revi-
sionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 700 (1995).
109. See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers,
76 IND. L.J. 803, 816 (2001).
110. See Sally Brown Richardson, Nonuse and Easements: Creating a Pliability Regime
of Private Eminent Domain, 78 TENN. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010).
111. See Scott J. Kennelly, Florida's Eminent Domain Overhaul: Creating More Prob-
lems Than It Solved, 60 FLA. L. REV. 471, 496-97 (2008).
112. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 218-19. But cf D. Alan White, Comment, The Doc-
trine of Equivalents: Fairness and Uncertainty in an Era of Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60
EMORY L.J. 751, 792 (2011) (arguing that "injunctive relief should certainly be denied in
biologics cases involving the doctrine of equivalents").
113. Although the analogy between physical and intellectual property explains some of
the vexing issues afflicting the patent system, the principles underlying traditional property
cannot answer every question of note in the domain of patent law for several reasons. First,
the cost of accessing the legal system is greater in the patent realm, as litigating such a case to
trial typically costs in the realm of three to five million dollars. This results in significant
underenforcement, which one might characterize as a quasi fair-use right. Second, a critical,
complicating distinction concerns the public goods nature of innovation. Unlike a piece of
land or other physical resource, an idea is not subject to a supply constraint. This means that
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III. THE REPORT
Having thus explored the relationship between notice and remedies, and
having explained the instructive value of traditional property law in deter-
mining optimal policy in the patent realm, this Part turns to material aspects
of the Report. Consistent with the preceding analysis, this Essay construes
the Report as seeking to reorient the patent system to realize more of the
benefits associated with the traditional property system. It does so by articu-
lating a variety of proposals aimed at improving notice, thus promoting ex
ante bargaining, optimal patentee compensation, efficient commercializa-
tion, and desirable levels of follow-on invention. Recognizing, however, that
certain fields of innovative activity do not, and perhaps cannot, lend them-
selves to sufficiently high levels of notice, the FTC recommends
incorporating a liability rule approach where appropriate. The Report thus
addresses a critical component of the infrastructure that one must put in
place to induce optimal rates of innovation.
It bears emphasizing at the outset that the Report, which benefitted from
eight days of hearings, conducts an authoritative analysis of important fea-
tures of the contemporary U.S. patent system.' 14 It will doubtless inform
courts for many years to come in cutting-edge analysis and will constitute
an important point of reference for ongoing research in the academic field.
As this Essay could not possibly recount each detail of the Report, it seeks
to draw attention to some of the Report's most important features.
The Report begins by explaining the growing economic importance of
"open innovation," a now widely used, though perhaps unfortunately
phrased,"' term that describes the phenomenon of companies that eschew
the traditional model of conducting all R&D in-house and instead acquire
valuable technology from third parties."' Technology transfer is obviously
integral to this process, and the FTC correctly observes that the patent sys-
tem serves an important role in its facilitation."7 The agency places a
particular emphasis on ex ante transactions, which are by definition efficient
and conducive to innovation."' Pre-commercialization licensing allows
product-manufacturing companies to shop among competing purveyors of
substitute technologies to find the qualitatively superior or best-value tech-
the law can maximize social welfare by adopting a parsimonious approach, limiting patentee
compensation to the level necessary to induce ex ante invention and commercialization, and
then making the idea freely available. See Alan Devlin, Law's Parsimony Principle, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693 (2010). Economics generally teaches that property rights over
technology should be ephemeral while those over physical resources should be perpetual. See
PoSNER, supra note 51, at 52-53.
114. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
I 15. In the sphere of intellectual property, "open" often refers to nonproprietary.
I16. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 31-48.
117. Id. at 32-45.
118. Id. at 32-48.
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nology and to agree on a royalty that reflects the licensed technology's mar-
ginal contribution in value to the end product.
The FTC contrasts such arrangements with the increasingly prevalent
phenomenon of ex post arrangements in which a company already uses a
patented technology when approached by the patentee." 9 Although the law
must allow patent holders to enforce their rights in such situations-lest
third parties purposefully ignore IP rights when they could have bargained,
thus denying inventors their due reward-after-the-fact infringement pro-
ceedings are generally undesirable because they result in inefficient
duplication and, in the presence of sunk costs, allow patentees to extract
greater value than they could have obtained ex ante.20 No one could reason-
ably contest the Report's conclusion that the law should favor ex ante
technology-transfer transactions to ex post ones and that improving the no-
tice function of patents would promote the former. The increasing
prevalence of IT industry PAEs-which neither manufacture goods nor en-
gage in before-the-fact technology transfer, but specialize in asserting
patents against companies that sell products to consumers-is emblematic
of this problem.' 2'
Chapter 3 of the Report explores the heart of the notice dilemma, which
frustrates ex ante technology transfer and fuels PAE activity.122 The Report
observes that notice problems occur due to the inherent imprecision of lan-
guage, the lack of clear nomenclature in certain fields, the problem-inducing
practice of functional claiming, the difficulty of reviewing myriad patents
that exist in some fields, and the danger of "submarine" patenting, by which
inventors can keep patents secret for the first eighteen months of prosecution
(and sometimes longer)'23 and can use continuations to amend claims to
cover products that competitors have recently marketed. 24 The FTC ex-
presses particular concern about the lax enforcement of the Patent Act's
definiteness requirement in Section 112; the Federal Circuit merely asks
whether a claim is "insolubly ambiguous"-a standard that all but the most
hopelessly unclear claims can meet.125 The FTC applauds the Board of Pa-
tents Appeals and Interferences' 2008 view that a claim is insufficiently
119. Id. at 49-72.
120. Both of these observations are correct, but are subject to qualifications. For in-
stance, multiple acts of independent invention may give rise to positive spillover effects that
outweigh the costs of wasteful competition. This is most likely when innovation is not capital
intensive but rapid and cumulative. Furthermore, hold out does not necessarily occur in every
ex post transaction and is not present when the patent did not face competition from techno-
logical substitutes ex ante.
121. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 60-72.
122. Id. at 74-135.
123. If an inventor does not file a patent application outside of the United States, she can
keep her pending U.S. application secret beyond the eighteen-month term. 35 U.S.C.
§I 22(b)(2)(B)(i)(2000).
124. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 74-135.
125. Id. at 98-102.
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definite at the prosecution stage if it is "amenable to two or more plausible
claim constructions."'26 The Report urges the PTO to adhere to that stricter
standard.' 27 It also encourages courts to place increased emphasis on defi-
niteness in the context of computer-implemented means-plus-function
claims with respect to which courts, to date, have required minimal details
regarding the relevant algorithm for performing the claimed function.'
The FTC also explores the optimal characteristics of the "person having
ordinary skill in the art" ("PHOSITA") for disclosure purposes.129 This con-
ceptual entity plays a key role in the patent system.'30 Perhaps
counterintuitively, the PHOSITA is not a proxy for the median scientist or
engineer in the relevant field, but is instead a judicial construct.'"' The
PHOSITA acts as a policy tool that courts can mold to better align incen-
tives imparted by the patent system with the innovation characteristics of the
industry at hand. The Report correctly reminds courts of the consequentialist
function performed by this "policy lever."3 2 By viewing the role of the
PHOSITA in this light, the judiciary can avoid falling prey to a formalistic
jurisprudence that would treat the PHOSITA identically across fields and
across inquiries.
In this latter respect, it bears emphasizing that the person of skill in the
art need not, and generally should not, bear the same traits for the purposes
of nonobviousness and enablement.133 The Federal Circuit has lost sight of
this distinction in its modern biotechnology jurisprudence.'34 In light of the
capital-intensive, though occasionally predictable, nature of R&D in this
field, the court correctly applies a low nonobviousness bar, thus treating the
PHOSITA for Section 103 purposes as being of diminished capacity.' 5 The
Federal Circuit, however, views that person similarly in the context of ena-
blement, requiring a detailed disclosure that essentially requires a patentee
to reveal the claimed gene sequence or structure at hand.' 3 6 This results in a
large number of narrow patents, which are easy to avoid and hence nonvalu-
126. Ex parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 2008 WL 5105055 (B.P.A.1. Nov. 19, 2008).
127. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 101-02.
128. Id. at 100-01.
129. Id. at 107-09.
I 30. See, e.g., J. Peter Paredes, Written Description Requirement in Nanotechnology:
Clearing a Patent Thicket?, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 489, 494 (2006) ("[T]he
legal principle of the PHOSITA analysis is perhaps the most important of all the legal princi-
ples[-").
131. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymoure, Atypical Inventions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 2057,
2067 n.40 (2011).
132. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1648-5 1.
133. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 149.
134. See id.
135. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 146, 149-50.
136. See, e.g., Matthew A. Chivvis, Improving Innovation by Reducing the Risk of In-
vesting in Biotechnology: Fixing the Enablement Standard, II INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 205,
205-25 (2007).
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able. 3 7 Some commentators worry that this may both reduce the incentive to
invent and aggravate the supposed anticommons effect in this industry."'
These problems result from the judiciary's excessively literal interpretation
of the PHOSITA, and so the Report sensibly directs courts to recognize the
policy-based-and hence malleable-foundation of this aspect of patent
jurisprudence.'39
Attacking the overarching problem of inadequate notice, the FTC pro-
poses a series of possible improvements. In IT industries, it suggests that the
PTO should require patent applicants either to designate a dictionary for
assigning meaning to claims or to accept a PTO-designated default diction-
ary.140 It further counsels the PTO to set up a task force to explore policies
that would yield more objective claim language over software inventions.141
Appealing to Congress, the FTC suggests an amendment in the law to re-
quire publication of all pending applications eighteen months after filing,
even for inventors who have not filed patent applications abroad.142
A particularly sensible recommendation is that the Federal Circuit
should revisit the manner in which it applies the written-description re-
quirement of Section 112.143 The traditional test asks whether the
specification provides "adequate support" for the claims.'" This inquiry
creates problems in the prosecution process when applicants engage in sub-
sequent applications that relate back to earlier ones. When an inventor seeks
to add new claims in a subsequent application, the PTO will allow her to do
so if the specification accompanying the original application adequately
supports the new claim.145 The FTC correctly points out, however, that the
terms in which the law frames this inquiry improperly distort the crucial role
of notice. The Report properly argues that "a true predictability inquiry
would move in the opposite direction-starting with the specification, it
would look forward to ask whether a PHOSITA would predict that these
claims would emerge."146 Were the PTO to apply the standard in this man-
ner, it would likely restrict the number of unforeseeable claims that emerge
from the prosecution process.
More controversially, but staying with the theme of improving notice,
the FTC argues that Congress should enact legislation to shield third parties
who "(i) infringe properly described claims only because of claim
137. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 149-50.
138. See id.
139. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 12, 107-12.
140. Id. at 109-10.
141. Id. at 112.
142. Id. at 125.
143. Id. at 12, 15, 104-09, 119-22, 125.
144. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
145. See, e.g., Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement,
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 129 (2010).
146. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 121.
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amendments (or new claims) following a continuation and (ii) developed,
used, or made substantial preparation for using, the relevant product or pro-
cess before the amended (or newly added) claims were published.""'
Although such an amendment would provide companies that commercialize
technology with some protection against ambush, it would harm applicants
who struggle to articulate claims that accurately convey the nature and con-
tours of the relevant invention. If a marketed product employs a technology
that an applicant legitimately invented first, then, in at least some circum-
stances, the law should allow the applicant to amend his claims to capture
the commercialized product. There ought to be only two limits on this right.
In the first place, the specification associated with the original application
must be sufficiently detailed to allow a PHOSITA to predict the later-added
claim. Second, the applicant must have encountered some legitimate diffi-
culty in properly describing the relevant technology through claim language.
The Report does not ignore the PTO's funding plight. It calls on Con-
gress to provide the agency with the resources it needs to tackle the
intimidating backlog of pending applications and to perform a competent
gatekeeping role in doing so.148 As noted below, Congress has partially
heeded this call through the AIA, which both bestows the PTO with fee-
setting authority and creates a specific fund for the agency. 49
As part of improving the prosecution process, the FTC encourages the
PTO to adopt an industry-based classification system to make prior-art
searches more effective. 5 0 Chapter 3 concludes by advising Congress to
enact legislation that requires public recordation of patent assignments, thus
allowing prospective licensees to identify the relevant parties with whom
they must bargain to obtain rights to the desired technology.' 5 '
The remainder of the Report addresses the critical issue of patent reme-
dies. After explaining the risks of both over- and under-compensation, the
FTC explains the relevant principles of economics that underlie calculation
of the two forms of damages: lost profits and reasonable royalties.152 The
agency's recommendations in this regard are of great importance for the
courts, not least because the counterfactual nature of computing damages
leads many judges who are not versed in economic theory astray. The Re-
port's principal recommendations with respect to calculating lost profits are
(1) advising courts to be lenient with plaintiffs in offering evidence of the
but-for world,'13 (2) urging the judiciary to eliminate the entire-market-value
rule, 5 4 and (3) encouraging judges not to recognize dual awards of lost prof-
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id. at 16, 117.
149. See infra Part IV.B.I.
150. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 126.
151. Id. at 131.
152. Id. at 137-212.
153. Id. at 184.
154. Id. at 211.
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its and reasonable-royalty damages.' 5 1 In determining reasonable royalties,
the FTC urges courts to rely on the willing-licensor/willing-licensee model
as the relevant conceptual framework, and to recognize that the often-
misconstrued Georgia-Pacific factors'56 are but a list of evidence categories,
rather than an objective formula for computing optimal damages.'57
Last, but certainly not least, the FTC goes to great lengths to warn
courts about the danger of hold out.' It points out that reasonable royalties
reflect the ex ante, as opposed to ex post, value of technology.'59 The agency
warns against allowing injunctive relief in cases involving PAEs and pro-
vides specific advice about patent-infringement suits in the standard-setting
arena. In this latter respect, the FTC suggests that a patentee's prior agree-
ment to license on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" ("RAND") terms
should preclude injunctive relief should the patentee and prospective licen-
see fail to reach agreement after a standard has emerged.160 Finally, the FTC
seeks to close a loophole in the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay,
which held that the law does not automatically entitle a patentee to injunctive
155. Id. at 19, 156-57.
156. The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors are as follows: (1) The royalties received by the
patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established roy-
alty; (2) the rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in
suit; (3) the nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or
non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be
sold; (4) the licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent mo-
nopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special
conditions designed to preserve that monopoly; (5) the commercial relationship between the
licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same
line of business, or whether they are inventor and promoter; (6) the effect of selling the patent-
ed specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of the
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of
such derivative or convoyed sales; (7) the duration of the patent and the term of the license; (8)
the established profitability of the product made under the patent, its commercial success, and
its current popularity; (9) the utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes
or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results; (10) the nature of the
patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced
by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention; (11) the extent to which
the infringer has made use of the invention, and any evidence probative of the value of that
use; (12) the portion of the profit or selling price that may be customary in the particular busi-
ness or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions;
(13) the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished
from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features
or improvements added by the infringer; (14) the opinion testimony of qualified experts; and
(15) the amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee would have agreed upon
(at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to
reach an agreement. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
157. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 179-85. See also infra text accompanying notes
174-178.
158. Id. at 229.
159. Id. at 64, 144-48, 194.
160. Id. at 194.
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relief should the latter prevail at trial.161 As the International Trade Commis-
sion can only grant relief in the form of exclusion or cease-and-desist
orders, the FTC worries that PAEs are availing themselves of the ITC as a
superior forum in which to extract supraoptimal royalties.162 If such patent-
ees can obtain an order from the ITC that is akin to an injunction, they can
credibly extract greater royalty payments than they could have negotiated ex
ante. The Report recommends that the ITC read the domestic-industry re-
quirement and public-interest prong of determining the availability of relief
to deny exclusion or cease-and-desist orders to PAEs.163
IV. JUDGING THE FTC's RECOMMENDATIONS
The Report articulates a wide number of sensible policy suggestions,
which mirror in important respects the work of Dan Burk and Mark Lemley.
Those leading academics recommend that courts engage in art-specific
analysis to tailor the tenets of the patent system to reflect the characteristics
of the innovation process at hand.'" In the short time since the Report's re-
lease, criticism has emerged to the effect that the Report improperly focuses
on policy rather than doctrine.'6 1 Such disapproval, of course, would apply
equally to the work of those scholars who advocate malleable jurisprudence
that is sensitive to the tenets of the relevant technology before the court.
This broad attack on the Report provides an appropriate starting point
for analysis. Is the criticism that the Report is too policy focused well
founded? The answer is no. In the first place, such criticism fails to appreci-
ate current Federal Circuit practice, for it is widely understood that the
judiciary has already developed an art-specific jurisprudence.166 Second, and
more importantly, in a consequence-critical field such as innovation policy,
we do not want those charged with operating the patent system to blindly
follow a course founded on a dogmatic reading of statute or uncritical ad-
herence to custom. Of course, this does not mean that we should be free to
adopt rules or policies inconsistent with the relevant statutory framework,
but instead that policymakers should remember that interpretation of a prin-
161. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
162. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 239-43.
163. Id. A patentee can satisfy the domestic-industry requirement by showing "substan-
tial investment in [the patent's] exploitation, including engineering, research and development
or licensing." Id. at 30 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)).
164. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 143-44, 162.
165. See Benjamin Levi & Rodney R. Sweetland, The Federal Trade Commission's
(FTC) Recommendations to the International Trade Commission (ITC): Unsound, Unmeas-
ured, and Unauthoritative, 2011 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 1, available at http://www.
patentlyo.com/files/levi.ftcunsound.pdf.
166. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 70, at 1156-57. As just one example, early bio-
technology jurisprudence went to significant lengths to find medical -diagnostic tests founded
on monoclonal antibodies to be nonobvious despite the prior-art literature to the contrary. See
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 144-46.
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ciple or a standard necessarily lends itself to a range of legitimate answers.
In this respect, the correct answer constitutes a spectrum rather than a point.
In choosing the appropriate answer, a pragmatic, consequence-based ap-
proach is prudent. This is especially true with respect to patent law given its
utilitarian focus grounded in the explicit terms of the Constitution.
Having addressed this broad indictment of the Report and the policy
bases upon which it stands, there is little reason to recount the Report's
well-articulated reasons for making its recommendations. The FTC clearly
devoted considerable thought, founded on both economic theory and actual
industry conditions as established through eight days of hearings, in formu-
lating its conclusions. Instead, this Essay explores a small number of
notable omissions and challenges certain questionable policy prescriptions.
A. Avoiding Controversy
Restraint is a defining feature of the FTC's 2011 Report. The pressing
issues pervading the patent system have invited a series of proposed solu-
tions, the scale and ambition of which differ considerably. As a positive
matter, the more radical the proposed change to the patent regime, the less
likely it is that its proponent can achieve the requisite consensus to effect the
change. Against this practical constraint, however, one must weigh the fact
that the more modest, and hence widely acceptable, the proposed prescrip-
tion, the less likely it is to provide an effective solution. Conversely, the cost
of error increases in proportion with the radical nature of the suggested
amendment. In addition, the sharply heterogeneous nature of industrial in-
novation makes it unlikely that a broad alteration in the patent system will
have uniformly beneficial effects. Thus, from a policy perspective, there is a
tension between introducing changes to the patent regime in a modest, in-
cremental, and cautious manner, and doing so on a potentially more
effective, though risk-filled and controversial, large-scale basis. It is clear
that the FTC's recommendations fall on the former side of the spectrum.
The Report does make a number of material, and somewhat controver-
sial, policy prescriptions. Of these, the most divisive may be the view that
the International Trade Commission should: (1) take the position that a pa-
tentee whose sole exploitation of its patent involves ex post licensing does
not satisfy the domestic-industry condition of filing suit with the ITC and
(2) use Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930's requirement that the ITC con-
sider "the public health and welfare" in determining whether the relief it
grants would cause, or facilitate, hold up.' 6 As a practical matter, were the
ITC to embrace these suggestions, it would deny PAEs a remedy in that fo-
rum. In addition, the ITC can only take remedial actions akin to granting
injunctive relief: specifically, it can grant an exclusion order, which prohibits
167. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-42, 239-44.
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importation of the relevant articles, or a cease-and-desist order.18 The FTC's
recommendation in this respect, then, may be somewhat divisive because it
would deny certain patentees access to the ITC. The proper response to crit-
icism of this sort is to point out that federal district courts remain open to
such patentees. Those courts offer remedies properly tailored to the actions
of PAEs-that is, damages properly calibrated to reflect the ex ante value of
the patented technology.
Another aspect of the Report that may be divisive is the call for courts
to adhere strictly to the hypothetical-negotiation model in calculating rea-
sonable royalties in the event of proven infringement.169 Some consider this
mode of computing damages, which asks what the parties would have
agreed to had they bargained for a license ex ante, to be intolerably ab-
stract.'70 Without accurate judicial determination of reasonable royalties,
however, the incentives generated by the patent system will not align with
the social optimum.' 7 ' The FTC is on strong ground, then, in pointing out a
number of economically indefensible practices adopted by district judges in
damages proceedings. These include the economically erroneous entire-
market-value rule, which invites systemic overcompensation by asking
fact finders to place their frame of reference on the profitability of a larger
product.'72 This aspect of patent jurisprudence has long been the subject of
academic criticism."' A less notorious, but nevertheless potentially im-
proper, element of damages analysis concerns the ubiquitously applied
Georgia-Pacific factors.'74
The agency concludes that the proper framework in which to calculate
the optimal amount due a patentee is the willing-licensor/willing-licensee
model. Unfortunately, the hypothetical nature of this test has led some judg-
es to eschew proper use of that inquiry in light of the fact that the parties
have, by definition, failed to reach a prior agreement.'7 5 Because it is diffi-
cult to construct the relevant counterfactual in a manner that comports with
168. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d)-(f).
169. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 159-76.
170. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BY.U. L. REv. 1661, 1679.
171. Indeed, it is widely understood in law and economics literature that excessive dam-
ages induce a variety of inefficient second-order effects. See, e.g., Jesse Max Creed, Note,
Integrating Preliminary Agreements into the Interference Torts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1253
(2010). It is no different with respect to patents. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1813, 1860 n.159 (1984).
172. See Alan Devlin, Systemic Bias in Patent Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/author- 1271852 (discussing the entire-market-value rule in
further detail).
173. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 656 (2009).
174. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
175. See Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent In-
fringement Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REV. 909, 923-24 (2009).
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the reality of the parties' relationship, courts sometimes implicitly abandon
this form of inquiry.17 6 The great virtue of the hypothetical-negotiation test,
however, is that it focuses the inquiry on the economically important ques-
tion: what was the economic value of the relevant product or process ex
ante?
The seminal Georgia-Pacific factors, however, do not focus courts'
analysis on this relevant question. The FTC correctly points out that these
highly influential guidelines "do not provide a conceptual framework for
calculating damages."'7 7 Indeed, these factors amount to little more than a
laundry list of considerations that may or may not be material in a particular
instance. When multiple factors are relevant to the case at hand-as will
invariably be the case-the law provides no overriding principle by which to
quantify and hence to weigh conflicting indicators. As Judge Easterbrook
succinctly commented in a different setting, "a list of factors without a rule
of decision is just a chopped salad.""'
The Report is therefore correct to call on courts to focus on a royalty
that reflects what the parties would have agreed to in a but-for world that
lacked the transaction costs that precluded bargaining in the first place. To
give this principle its full force, the judiciary must be willing to follow it
even in counterintuitive instances. For instance, where a patentee would
have refused to license at the infringing party's highest (reservation) price,
then the optimal damages calculation is in fact zero where the patentee can
establish no lost profits.
More generally, one might take issue with the FTC's criticism of inade-
quate notice with respect to functional claiming.'7 9 Although claiming the
result achieved rather than the process by which the invention reaches that
end creates overbreadth and inadequate notice problems, a ready solution is
by no means apparent. If one were to significantly restrict functional claim-
ing and require detailed disclosure of the means by which a product or
process operates, patentees in certain fields would possess narrow patents
that third parties could easily avoid.'8 0 With respect to computer software,
for instance, there is invariably a multitude of ways to write code to achieve
a particular end,'"' and so a patent that cannot cover a function will be of
limited value.18 2
176. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 168-70 (citing and discussing cases).
177. Id. at 21.
178. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001).
179. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 100-01.
180. Cf Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1086-87 (2008) (explaining that design around is often difficult because
the Federal Circuit's lax application of the enablement and written description doctrines "has
generally allowed patentees to claim their inventions much more broadly than the embodi-
ments disclosed in the patent specification").
181. See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
182. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Indus-
try?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 961, 1012-13 (2005).
565Spring 2012]1
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Notwithstanding the FTC's well-reasoned efforts in the above areas, the
FTC conspicuously avoids embracing radical solutions to the vexing issues
of notice and remedies in patent law. Indeed, the Report may be most nota-
ble for two significant omissions.
1. The Problem of Disclosure
Take the serious problem of inadequate disclosure.18 3 Most inventions
subject to patent protection are at least somewhat self-disclosing, in that
they are vulnerable to reverse engineering. For such innovations, a certain
level of disclosure is coterminous with the fact of invention itself. A
commonly promoted function of the patent system is its requirement that an
inventor of a new, useful, and nonobvious technology explain its workings
to those skilled in the art. 8 4 Unfortunately, the patent regime performs this
disclosure role in a woefully inadequate manner. In most industries, the
Federal Circuit has given the enablement and written description require-
ments of Section 112 such minimalist definition that the patent system has
an exceedingly modest impact in facilitating the dissemination of technolog-
ical know-how.'8 Indeed, in many cases, the patent regime would not seem
to increase the quality of disclosure beyond what follows from the invention
and subsequent commercialization of the relevant invention itself.
The culprit is the "person having ordinary skill in the art," whom the
Federal Circuit typically characterizes as being sufficiently knowledgeable
that a patentee need not describe the full operation of the claimed invention
to enable the PHOSITA to use the invention without undue experimenta-
tion.' 86 In the case of software patents, to take just one example, the law
does not require a patent applicant to disclose the source code underlying
the invention.'"8 The lack of disclosure requirements in the field of computer
software permits inventors to use general language in their claims that pur-
ports to capture a sphere of invention beyond that disclosed in the
specification. 8 8 The more ingenious the law presupposes the PHOSITA to
be in determining the operation of a claimed technology, the greater the gulf
between claimed patent scope and disclosure.18 9 In those fields where lan-
guage is incapable of precisely demarcating the boundaries of a claimed
183. See, e.g., Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof),
I18 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005).
184. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
185. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, The Compatibility of Patent Law and the Internet, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2795 (2010).
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Robotic Vision Sys. v. View Eng'g, 112 F.3d 1163, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
188. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 356-57
(2010).
189. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon,
46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 443-44 (2004).
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invention, the divide between scope and disclosure is directly responsible
for lack of notice. Thus, in such IT industries as electronic goods, semicon-
ductors, telecommunications, and computer software, the notoriously
indeterminate meaning of patents results in large part from the Federal Cir-
cuit's failure to stringently apply the requirements of Section 112.
The Report seeks to ameliorate notice conditions in the IT sphere by
suggesting, among other things, that inventors designate specific dictionaries
to explain claim terms. Such prescriptions, however, are apt to have only a
modest impact on the problem of inadequate notice. An effective solution
would treat the PHOSITA for enablement purposes as enjoying limited in-
ferential, gap-filling, and reverse-engineering capacities. To satisfy Section
112 in light of such a presumption, the law would require patentees to dis-
close the full workings of their claimed inventions. If a patentee
subsequently alleged infringement, the patentee would have to demonstrate
that the specification underlying the patent explicitly disclosed the material
features of the allegedly infringing product or process. Such an approach
would largely solve the notice problem, thus facilitating efficient contractual
bargaining in the form of technology transfer.
The Report, however, declines to take a position on whether patent
scope should be coextensive with the written description in the specification.
Given the FTC's focus on solving the dilemma of inadequate patent notice,
one could argue that this is a significant shortcoming. If the law were to in-
sist that a patent's reach be coextensive with the technology specifically
revealed by the written description, it would solve the notice problem that
has plagued the patent system, particularly in IT. It would also greatly sim-
plify the confoundingly complex legal task of claim construction, by which
courts strive to give precise meaning to disputed claim terms. One of the
biggest impediments to accurate construction is the tension between the
Federal Circuit's dueling instructions that one must read claims in light of
the specification, which is "the single best guide to a disputed term" and
often "dispositive," and yet refrain from importing limitations into claims
from the specification.'90
That the FTC elected to eschew such a recommendation is notable for
several reasons. From one perspective; it might demonstrate an unwilling-
ness to tackle head-on the most vexing issues facing the patent system.
From another, however, it reveals a pragmatic outlook and an appropriate
sense of caution. It bears emphasizing that the economic case for making
the scope of patent claims and the invention revealed in the disclosure coex-
tensive is far from bulletproof.
The major problem with limiting patent scope to the disclosure is that it
threatens to under-reward some inventors by narrowing their sphere of
190. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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exclusivity."' The problem of undercompensation may be particularly wor-
risome in capital-intensive research industries.192 Such a restrictive reading
of scope would result in narrow patents that competitors could easily evade
by making relatively superticial changes to the claimed product or pro-
cess.'9 3 This could facilitate an excessive level of third-party appropriation
of a hard-won technology, thus discouraging inventors from engaging in
costly R&D ex ante. To avoid such an outcome, courts might appeal to the
doctrine of equivalents to expand the zone of exclusivity, though of course
such a solution comes at the cost of notice because predicting the applica-
tion of the doctrine to products or processes beyond the claims is not always
straightforward.1 94 Enhancing disclosure requirements also increases the
cost of the prosecution process for applicants.'
"Narrow" patents may also be undesirable where a company must com-
bine numerous complementary technologies to create a final product. By
severely restricting patent scope, the law would encourage inventors to ob-
tain a large number of narrow patents. By increasing the number of patents
for which a commercializing entity needs to obtain licenses, the law would
create or exacerbate anticommons effects.
These problematic features are far from academic and have in fact mate-
rialized in the biotechnology field. With respect to gene patents, the Federal
Circuit has construed the PHOSITA as requiring detailed instructions to rec-
reate the claimed gene structure. Indeed, the law now limits patentees' zone
of exclusivity in this field as being coextensive with the sequence or struc-
ture actually disclosed. As Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have noted, the
result is that DNA patents may be relatively easy to avoid infringing.196
The question whether to limit scope to disclosure is certainly vexing.
Indeed, the possible gulf between invention disclosed by the specification
and the claims implicates not only claim meaning, but also the permissibil-
ity of new claims obtained through continuation practice. Making patentees'
exclusive rights coterminous with the specification would solve the notice
problem but would raise others. From a normative perspective, of course,
the fact that a change in policy would create new costs is not a legitimate
objection unless there is some basis to believe that those costs would out-
weigh the benefits. To determine whether the net benefits of solving the
notice problem in such draconian fashion are indeed positive, further study
is likely required. From this perspective, one can applaud the FTC for de-
191. See Cindy I. Liu, Written Description: Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 123 (1999); Thomas, supra note 61, at 234.
192. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 149-53.
193. See, e.g., id. at 149.
194. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting).
195. See Fromer, supra note 25, at 594.
196. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 149.
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cining to make a recommendation that could conceivably do more harm
than good.
2. Introducing an Independent-Invention Defense
There is a second notable omission in the Report. Specifically, the FTC
declined to articulate a view on the propriety of an independent-invention
defense. This divisive issue is distinct from the question of notice, and in-
stead goes to the fundamental purpose of the patent system.'97
An important distinction between physical and intellectual property is
that the latter is nonrivalrous in consumption.19 8 An inventor can disseminate
technological knowledge at very low cost, which permits the public at large
to avail itself of that information without reducing the quantity and quality
of the knowledge available for others' use. This feature of intellectual prop-
erty reveals that lawmakers can maximize social welfare by awarding
exclusive rights only to the extent necessary to induce invention and subse-
quent commercialization. As a result, the exclusive right inherent in a patent
carries a cost that increases in proportion with the value of the patented
technology. By providing a single entity control over an idea, the law denies
all interested third parties use of the technology, even though third-party use
would not diminish the quality of the technology available for others. This
cost is justified on economic grounds to ensure inventors receive a sufficient
return to compensate them for the risk and expense of R&D and to induce
them to devote the necessary capital to commercialize the relevant technolo-
gy.199
This economic rationale for the patent system is important. The begin-
ning of the Report observes that "by preventing copying that might
otherwise drive down prices, the patent system allows innovators to recoup
their investment in R&D."200 This accurately describes the public goods the-
ory that justifies IP law. Surprisingly, however, this is an inaccurate
description of how the patent system actually works in practice. All patent
cases allege infringement, of course, but few *o much as allege copying.20 1
The reality of current U.S. patent law is that patentees typically seek to enjoin
197. See generally Mauer & Scotchmer, supra note 56, at 535-36 (concluding that in-
troducing an independent-invention defense would be efficient); Vermont, supra note 56
(arguing that independent-invention should preclude a finding of patent infringement). But see
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 799, 812-15 (2002) (suggesting that an independent-invention defense
would be most likely to apply to those inventions that create limited deadweight loss and
pointing out the difficulty of proving whether a defendant copied or independently discovered
the relevant technology).
198. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA.
L. REV. 273, 326 n.153 (1995).
199. See POSNER, supra note 51, at 40-42.
200. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
201. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 46, at 1424.
569Spring 2012]1
570 . Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
third parties that manufactured infringing products and processes without
relying on the asserted patents.2 02 It is difficult to reconcile this phenomenon
with the economic justification for the patent regime.2 03
Instead, the patent system works by creating a sphere of exclusivity that
permits patentees to capture and enjoin independently discovered products
and processes falling within it.204 Although this might appear improper, it is
both a defining feature of the U.S. patent system and potentially an im-
portant one. In the presence of an independent-invention defense, companies
would have incentives to remain ignorant of patents in their field if they
thought they could create the requisite technology in house.2 05 This would of
course be inimical to the supposed function of the patent system in dissemi-
nating knowledge to facilitate follow-on innovation. It could also do
violence to the patent regime's most important function, which is to induce
people and companies to invent. By restricting the zone of exclusivity creat-
ed by a patent, an exemption for independent invention would reduce the
royalty rate on which patentees and prospective licensees would rationally
agree. Although this would have beneficial effects in many settings by in-
creasing output, the positive effect would be far less clear on industries that
involve capital- and risk-intensive invention and commercialization profiles,
such as biotechnology. Furthermore, such a defense would increase the av-
erage cost of litigated patent cases by introducing a new (and dispositive)
question as to the fact of independent invention.
Yet many economists believe that an independent-invention defense, or
perhaps a sufficiently broad prior-user right,206 is desirable.207 In the first
place, an independent-invention defense would instantly eliminate the prob-
lem of PAEs that operate as a tax on the value-creating activities of
companies that market technologies.20 s Second, it would reduce the social
costs of patent races, in which multiple companies expend scarce resources
202. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709
(2012).
203. See id.
204. See id.; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974) (ex-
plaining that patent protection "goes not only to copying the subject matter ... but also to
independent creation"); Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 46, at 1424.
205. Conversely, however, such a defense would presumably spur patentees to dissemi-
nate information as to the workings of their claimed inventions, thus reducing the likelihood
that a third party would subsequently engage in independent invention. On the other hand, by
taking away the primary advantage of the contemporary patent system in providing functional
exclusivity, an independent-invention defense would drive some inventors to opt for trade-
secret protection. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 197, at 815-17.
206. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution 25-29 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13141, 2007), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/wl3141.pdf.
207. See, e.g., Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 56, at 535; Vermont, supra note 56, at
479.
208. See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2007).
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on duplicative research projects. 20 Absent positive spillover effects, such
duplicative expenditures are wasteful and therefore inefficient. Furthermore,
an independent-invention defense would encourage licensing in some cir-
cumstances. 210 Finally, although such a defense would reduce the value of a
patent, some economists argue that it may not reduce incentives to inno-
vate. 211
There may be a strong case for an independent-invention defense if we
cannot fix the patent system's broken notice function. If the principal cost of
such a defense is to induce companies to ignore patents ex ante and to con-
duct the relevant R&D in house, then that price may be modest in those
industries where ignorance of patents is commonplace. Companies in the IT
field, especially, already ignore patents en masse, forego ex ante technology
licensing in forging new products, and independently develop desired tech-
nology. Of course, the impact of such a defense in fields in which patents'
notice function operates well, such as the pharmaceutical industry, could be
more significant. This observation counsels caution.
This phenomenon of duplicative effort stems in part from the failure of
today's patent system to impart adequate notice. If policymakers cannot ad-
dress this failure, they are unlikely to be able to induce widespread ex ante
technology transfer. The Report's recommendations to improve notice,
though well founded, are insufficiently significant to provide a meaningful
solution.
What should one make of the fact that the FTC declined to recommend
or disapprove of an independent-invention defense? This feature of the Re-
port is emblematic of its restrained approach. There is no doubt that
introducing such a defense would be a radical change, as it would eliminate
a unique and central feature of the U.S. patent system. Although such a fun-
damental change may have desirable effects, especially in IT industries,
policymakers must be sensitive to the possible negative effects of such a rule
on incentives in other settings. The law would have to cabin an independent-
invention defense in a number of ways to hedge against the danger of
unforeseen and undesirable consequences.
There may be a more responsible way to achieve the benefits of an in-
dependent-invention defense without running the risk of harming innovation
in certain industries. Although the Report did not address the possibility,
courts, the PTO, lawmakers, and academics should begin to take seriously
the idea that simultaneous, or close-in-time, innovation constitutes a strong
indicator of inevitability. Absent large capital expenditures, rapid instances
209. It should be noted, however, that patent races may have offsetting benefits in the
form of positive spillover effects. In this respect, a losing company's investment in R&D may
produce insights and technology that prove useful for other projects.
210. See John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, I II YALE
L.J. 2251, 2272 (2002).
211. See Lemley, supra note 208, at 1527.
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of independent discovery counsel a finding of obviousness. The PTO and
courts should generally find a claimed product or process to be obvious in
light of evidence that the claimed technology is but the first instance of nu-
merous and close-in-time acts of independent invention.
By properly tailoring the obviousness inquiry, the law can ensure that
only inventors of technologies that were not inevitable in the short run can
obtain a twenty-year exclusive right.212 In doing so, however, courts must
avoid fashioning a dogmatic rule that would deny patents in the event of
rapid instances of separate invention. The prospect of an exclusive award
may entice several competing firms to engage in costly R&D toward the
same goal, thus leading each to invent the same or comparable technology.
Such instances of independent invention result from a patent race and do not
in themselves warrant a finding of obviousness.2 13 Absent the prospect of a
monopoly return, inventors may be unwilling to devote the scarce capital
necessary to invent the relevant technology, such that an excessively high
obviousness bar may transform a situation of simultaneous invention into
one of no, or significantly delayed, invention. 214 Consistent with the struc-
ture of the Patent Act itself, the law should decline to draw a formal and
conclusive equation between independent invention and obviousness.21 5
Nevertheless, the judiciary and the PTO should treat contemporaneous
discovery of the same technology as prima facie evidence of obviousness,
which patentees could rebut in a manner consistent with the principles dis-
cussed above. Such a change in practice would allow the patent system to
experience some of the benefits of a formal independent-invention defense
without risking a potentially serious upset in incentives in certain industry
segments. It would also bypass a further cost of introducing such a defense,
which would be the difficulty and hence cost of determining whether copy-
ing had in fact occurred.
3. A Restrained Approach
In summary, the FTC's recommendations are noteworthy for not ad-
dressing two major issues that some might argue constitute the proverbial
elephant in the room. The questions of whether courts should limit patent
scope to the invention actually disclosed in the specification and whether
Congress should introduce an independent-invention defense are of the ut-
212. This reading of obviousness comports with the Supreme Court's view that the pur-
pose of the nonobviousness doctrine is to weed out "those inventions which would not be
disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 11 (1966).
213. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1677 (2011).
214. See, e.g., id. at 1663.
215. See Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877 883
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Because Title 35 provides for interference proceedings, it implicitly recog-
nizes that contemporaneous independent invention may not alone show obviousness.").
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most importance, for they have the potential to solve some of the most
pressing issues that currently fuel the patent crisis. Nevertheless, it does not
follow that these omissions constitute flaws, serious or otherwise, in the
Report. Had the FTC recommended that Congress enact broad prior-user
rights, introduce an independent-invention defense, or require that courts
read claims as being no broader than the disclosure contained in the relevant
specification, it would have ignited a firestorm of controversy. The case for
such dramatic changes is not ironclad, as each could have potentially signif-
icant negative repercussions on the innovation incentives of some important
inventors.
Although there may be reason to think that the benefits of such a fun-
damental rewriting of patent law would exceed the costs, as a practical
matter one would have to present a compelling case to achieve such reform.
The U.S. patent system has served the country well for generations. Law-
makers would understandably be hesitant to overhaul it in a radical fashion.
For that reason, the restrained nature of the Report is likely a positive fea-
ture. By limiting its recommendations to those that are not vulnerable to
serious counterargument, the FTC simply made it more likely that courts
and the PTO will adopt their policy suggestions. One might also applaud the
agency's caution by appealing to the cardinal rule of medicine: "First, do no
harm."216 In the terminology of decision theory, the error cost of mistakenly
undercutting incentives to invent would be severe. A 2010 report by the De-
partment of Commerce tied three quarters of post-World War II growth in
the U.S. economy to innovation.2 17
B. Questioning Certain Aspects of the Report
Although the FTC's policy recommendations are generally well found-
ed, certain ancillary features of the Report are either misplaced or in need of
clarification. This section critically analyses these aspects of the Report and
suggests a number of qualifications to the FTC's recommendations. It be-
gins with one of the FTC's sensible recommendations, which nevertheless
stands to benefit from some elaboration.
1. Financing the Prosecution Process
Let us begin with the ostensibly straightforward subject of funding the
PTO. That office has the unenviable task of sifting through purported inven-
tions that cover a vast array of intricately complex technologies to determine
whether they meet the statutory requirements of novelty, nonobviousness,
216. See, e.g., Tiana Leia Russell, Unlocking the Genome: The Legal Case Against Ge-
netic Diagnostic Patents, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 81, 117 (2012).
217. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOT-
ING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBs 2 (2010), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migratedlPatent-Reform-paper.pdf.
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utility, and disclosure. Unfortunately, the PTO has been overwhelmed by the
slightly over three-quarters-of-a-million applications presently pending be-
fore it,2 18 and so it may be unsurprising that its performance has suffered.
There is abundant evidence that the office routinely approves applications it
should not. Empirical evidence of patent validity determinations at trial is
illuminating: courts invalidate between 42% and 46% of patents that parties
litigate to judgment. This high error rate, which arises notwithstanding the
high evidentiary burden that plaintiffs must currently meet to invalidate a
patent, would not startle anyone who is familiar with the workings of the
PTO. The average time from submission of a patent application to final ac-
tion is now in excess of three years, and yet during that time an examiner
spends an average of only eighteen hours on each application. 219 The ex
parte nature of the proceeding, what some consider to be a culture of per-
missibility at the PTO, 220 and the lack of an affirmative obligation on
applicants to search the prior art for anticipatory references, further under-
mine the quality of examiners' final determinations. 221 In addition, abuse of
continuation practice has led some to suspect that examiners approve appli-
cations more often than they should. 222
In light of these problems, and the axiomatic importance of the prosecu-
tion process, improving the PTO's performance is surely an important
component of fixing the patent crisis. It naturally follows from this observa-
tion that government funding of the PTO must increase. Consistent with that
view, the Report recommends that the government provide the office with
greater resources to work through the current backlog and to improve the
quality of its determinations. 223
It is questionable, however, that the PTO will receive sufficient funding
to shorten pendency times significantly and to improve the quality of the
prosecution process. In April 2011 the PTO lost approximately $100 million
from its budget, which represents a ten percent cut. The AIA improved the
situation by granting the PTO fee-setting authority and providing for a fund
for the agency. The act, however, also limits the use of this fund "[t]o the
218. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010 18 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/
ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf.
219. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495,
1500 (2001).
220. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN.
J.L. SCl. & TECH. 1, 21 (2007).
221. See, e.g., All About Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/
smallbusiness/patents/filing.htmI (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that "a search of the
prior art before the filing of an application is not required").
222. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continua-
tions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 64,71-83 (2004).
223. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
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extent and in the amounts provided in appropriations Acts," which bodes ill
for the PTO's ability to access these resources in their entirety.224
This Essay broadly agrees with the Report's recommendation that Con-
gress give the PTO the resources it needs to do its job properly.
Nevertheless, there may be limits to the amount that society would efficient-
ly expend on improving the prosecution process. In a somewhat
controversial but nevertheless influential essay, Mark Lemley explained that
it might be desirable for the PTO to maintain a level of "rational ignorance"
in its determinations. 225 This view emanates from the fact that the vast ma-
jority of patents that the PTO issues are, and remain, commercially
worthless, such that money spent ensuring their consistency with the tech-
nical prerequisites of patentability is wasted. It is better, Lemley argues, to
allow courts to give an exhaustive ex post review to the relatively few
patents that turn out to be commercially valuable. Given the numerous
advantages enjoyed by the courts-in terms of resources, time, and most of
all access to information due to the inter partes nature of the litigation pro-
cess-it may be desirable to subject applications at the prosecution stage to
a form of clear-incompatibility review and to postpone truly scrutinizing
analysis to the ex post stage. However, efficiency would require the PTO to
give applications in certain fields greater scrutiny than others. This is partic-
ularly so in industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, where a
single patent grant can accompany an extraordinarily large capital invest-
ment.
These considerations warrant qualifying the FTC's recommendation as
to funding the PTO. While providing the office with much-needed resources
is surely an important step toward addressing the patent crisis, the govern-
ment may experience decreasing returns as they augment the level of
funding. It may be better to introduce a two-tier track of review that would
allow inventors of what are likely to be valuable technologies to self select
into a form of examination with elevated scrutiny, and in return receive a
more powerful patent.226
2. The "Incentive to Disclose" Fallacy
The Report's first significant error involves the oft-repeated fallacy that
the patent system creates an incentive to disclose. The FTC specifically
opines that the patent system "encourages ... disclosure" and submits that
"patents encourage inventors to make public what they might otherwise
keep secret."227
224. 35 U.S.C. § 42(c)(1) (2011); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 12-
29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011).
225. Lemley, supra note 219, at 1496.
226. See Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 Sw. U. L. REV.
323 (2008); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 32.
227. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-42.
575Spring 2012]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
This is a common mistake. In fact, economic analysis reveals that the
patent system operates in precisely the opposite manner, by creating a disin-
centive to disclose.228 It does so by increasing the price that an inventor must
pay to obtain a patent. By fulfilling the Section 112 requirements, an inven-
tor reduces the cost to its competitors of recreating the claimed technology.
By facilitating more effective reverse engineering and design around, the
enablement and written-description requirements of the Patent Act reduce
the allure of a patent to inventors of valuable technologies for which the
workings are not immediately apparent.
To appreciate the flaw in the FTC's analysis, consider three broad
categories of invention. First, there are technologies that are immediately
self-disclosing to the PHOSITA, who can tell either upon casual inspection
or at minimum expense how the claimed discovery operates. Second, there
are inventions that are susceptible to reverse engineering if third parties ex-
pend significant capital. Third, there are inventions (or, more commonly,
internally utilized processes) that are not vulnerable to reverse engineering.
These are non-self-disclosing inventions.
Which inventions will an inventor rationally patent? She will certainly
seek to patent the first category because a rival could otherwise readily copy
it. Such an invention is the classic public good on which an economic con-
ception of the patent system rests. In this instance, the principal and
overriding function of the patent regime is to cabin third-party appropria-
tion, thus creating an incentive to invent. Importantly, the value of disclosure
under Section 112 in this instance is exceedingly modest. This is because
the relevant technology was self-revealing, such that effective disclosure is
essentially synonymous with the fact of invention and commercialization.
Now consider the third category of invention, which is non-self-
disclosing. It should be clear that inventors of such technologies will not
rationally seek patent protection because they could obtain perpetual protec-
tion through trade secret. If the patent system had no disclosure
requirements, such inventors might seek patents so as to enjoin competitors
in the event that they engage in independent invention. As trade-secret laws
allow significant appropriation, however, thus generating powerful incen-
tives to invent non-self-disclosing technologies, it is open to question
whether patent availability would promote social welfare. The important
point, however, is that the cost of disclosure ensures that few inventors will
patent their discoveries. Ironically, of course, this is when the value of dis-
closure is greatest to society. In this manner, one can appreciate how Section
112 actually creates a disincentive to disclose.
Finally, consider the more important middle case, in which rivals can
probably reverse engineer technologies, but only at considerable expense
and over time. These inventions are candidates for patent protection, but
228. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010).
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Section 112 increases the costs of patenting, which drives at least some in-
ventors to trade secret. Thus, and counter to the Report's characterization,
patents actually encourage inventors to keep their inventions secret.
It bears emphasizing, however, that the preceding discussion does not
denigrate the value of disclosure to society. It is only to point out that insist-
ing on such disclosure increases the cost of patent protection to the inventors
of products and processes for which the operation is not immediately appar-
ent. All things being equal, greater disclosure is beneficial because it
facilitates the dissemination of relevant technology, thus promoting cumula-
tive innovation as well as monopoly-reducing design around. 229
Nevertheless, the contours of optimal disclosure are rarely obvious because
the benefits of requiring inventors to reveal the workings of their discoveries
may come at a cost to the incentive to invent. This last incentive is, of
course, the most important.
3. Draconian Penalties Do Not Necessarily
Spur Ex Post Transactions
The FTC makes an interesting observation in Chapter 2 of the Report
when it notes that excessive patent remedies and permanent injunctions en-
courage ex post transactions. 230 The agency makes these comments in the
context of the hold up problem in the patent-licensing realm. Ex post pro-
ceedings are undesirable because they take place in the context of sunk
capital investment and lock in. Substitute technologies that were available ex
ante no longer act as effectively in constraining the royalty rate for the as-
serted patent, which allows patentees to extract inflated rents ex post. Given
the inefficiencies of such after-the-fact licensing, the FTC is correct to focus
on possible steps that policymakers might implement to spur ex ante negoti-
ations.
Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the FTC's specific
suggestion that the fact of supraoptimal rewards for infringement spurs ex
post licensing. The prospect of a windfall return ex post certainly encour-
ages patentees not to search out licensees ex ante. Yet, patentees' windfall is
licensors' loss, and so inflated remedies in court create strong incentives for
potential infringers to bargain ex ante. This might seem to have a neutral
effect, such that patentees' reduced incentive to negotiate ex ante offsets the
concomitant desire for potential infringers to do just the opposite. There is
good reason, however, to believe that society should be more concerned
with spurring prospective licensees to seek out holders of the relevant patent
rights ex ante.
229. This last feature, however, is not necessarily beneficial. Whether an increased inci-
dence of design around is beneficial depends on the relative importance of initial to follow-on
invention. If design around is too easily available, the law may deny inventors of break-
through technologies an optimal reward.
230. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-58.
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Despite the preceding qualification of the FTC's observation, it does not
follow that artificially enhanced remedies ex post are desirable. The crucial
point echoes the discussion in Part II, which emphasized the primacy of no-
tice. If transaction costs are too high to facilitate ex ante bargaining, then
excessive rewards will compound the problem. By increasing the price of
infringement to third parties in circumstances where ex ante licensing is not
feasible, greater-than-optimal damages will simply discourage third parties
from engaging in commercialization in the first place. Excessive remedies,
in addition to having this undesirable effect, will further encourage strategic
hold out by patentees.
The point, consistent with law-and-economics theory, is that courts
should deny injunctive relief in high-transaction-cost settings where ex ante
bargaining was not feasible. Similarly, courts must strive to avoid providing
excessive damages, which undo the benefits of a liability-rule approach.
4. Treble Damages for Willful Infringement Serve a Purpose
Beyond Punishing the Infringer
In discussing the economic function of damages in patent cases, the
FTC articulates a number of insightful principles as to how different reme-
dies play complementary and partially distinct roles.23 ' The agency correctly
explains how properly tailored remedies perform a vital function in main-
taining optimal incentives in the marketplace. One cannot spur desirable ex
ante technology licensing if courts are apt to award subpar damages ex post.
Although systemic levels of inadequate damages in court will not eliminate
the incentive for prospective licensors and licensees to reach an agreement
before the fact, it will depress the royalty upon which those entities will ra-
tionally agree. Only if patentees can credibly threaten to obtain damages ex
post that correspond to the true economic valuc of their technologies can
they bargain for royalties ex ante that equate to that optimal level. The FTC,
therefore, is correct to emphasize that the law must align patentees' com-
pensation with their inventions' economic value.
In discussing the various forms of remedies, however, the Report makes
the interesting observation that "[e]nhanced damages are unique . . . because
they are meant to punish the infringer."232 This is not entirely true, as puni-
tive damages in the event of willful infringement serve an important
consequentialist goal consistent with the utilitarian underpinnings of the
patent system. It is a little-discussed fact of the contemporary patent regime
that the cost of enforcing one's exclusive patent rights in court is so great
that a significant level of nonenforcement takes place. As litigating a patent-
infringement dispute to trial typically costs in the realm of three to five
million dollars, the owners of many infringed patents never bring suit, thus
231. Id. at 138-48.
232. Id. at 141.
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creating a broad quasi-fair-use right. Consistent with this phenomenon, the
practice of many IT companies is simply to ignore the relatively costless
cease-and-desist letters that patentees regularly send them, knowing full
well that few of those patent holders are likely to initiate expensive judicial
proceedings.
This environment of underenforcement may not be entirely undesirable,
however, for it facilitates potentially innovation-enhancing activities such as
experimental use aimed at cumulative invention and invent around. This de
facto fair-use right justifies the currently restrictive law governing experi-
mental use, which operates to ensure that inventors of especially valuable
patents can enjoin efforts by their competitors to practice the claimed inven-
tion without permission.233
Chronic levels of underenforcement, though, threaten to produce nefari-
ous results. If third parties can routinely appropriate the value of others'
inventions free of reprisals due to the cost of asserting a patent in court, an
environment may develop that systemically undercompensates inventors of
breakthrough technologies. It is with respect to this danger that the law gov-
erning willful infringement plays an especially important role in
maintaining optimal incentives. If a competitor knows of another's patent
but purposefully proceeds to market an infringing product, it presumably
does so knowing that there is a significant likelihood that the patentee will
not bring a lawsuit that proceeds to trial. If the infringer deems the probabil-
ity of detection and successful enforcement by the patentee to be less than
certain, which is surely the case, then the law's only awarding damages in
an amount equal to the value of the patented technology creates a direct in-
centive to eschew licensing negotiations and instead to pay damage in the
event of a successful lawsuit. Depending on the likelihood of detection and
successful infringement proceedings, such a legal environment would seri-
ously undercompensate inventors.
Viewed in this light, one can appreciate that treble damages may play
important roles in ensuring adequate returns to patentees and in maintaining
incentives for potential infringers to bargain for permission ex ante. It is
therefore not the case that enhanced damages serve only to punish infring-
ers.
5. The Limited Efficacy of RAND Licensing Agreements
A central tenet of the Report is that courts should be loath to award in-
junctive relief in the event of ex post hold out. Nowhere is the phenomenon
of hold out more acute than in the standard-setting context in which patent-
ees conceal their IP rights only to assert them after the industry locks in on
an adopted standard that infringes their claimed technology. A
233. See Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599,
615 (2009).
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less-egregious but nonetheless problematic example also emanates from the
standards arena. This occurs where patentees engaged in the standard-
setting process agree to license their technologies on "reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms" ("RAND"), but later refuse to make them availa-
ble at what prospective licensees consider an appropriate price.23 4
The economic harm of hold out is clear. By ambushing companies that
seek to manufacture products incorporating the patented-technology-bearing
standard, patentees can extract greater royalties after the industry locks into
a standard. Although technological substitutes may have existed while the
standard-setting organization ("SSO") conducted negotiations as to the
proper standard, the fact of ex post investment in a chosen standard effec-
tively eliminates those substitutes as a price constraint on the chosen
technology. Some patentees have nefariously sought to capitalize on this
opportunity, invoking the ire of antitrust-enforcement agencies.
Given the FTC's overarching and well-founded prescription that proper-
ty rules are inappropriate in situations of hold out, it might come as little
surprise that the agency urges courts not to award injunctions to patentees
that previously agreed to make their rights available on RAND terms.2 35
Further examination, however, reveals that this particular recommendation is
deeply incongruous.
As explored above, the Report's general-albeit implied-prescription
is that courts should award injunctive relief in low-transaction-cost settings
in which the parties could have reached agreement at low cost ex ante, but
did not. This recommendation fits comfortably with traditional economic
theory, as discussed in Part II. The purpose of awarding an injunction ex
post is to spur potential infringers to use market mechanisms ex ante by bar-
gaining for access to the relevant technology. Private bargaining is desirable
because it relies on the superior information enjoyed by the parties them-
selves, creates legal certainty as to each party's ongoing legal obligations
and entitlements, and-assuming competence, rationality, and sufficient
access to information-ensures Pareto-superior outcomes as between the
contracting entities. As a general matter, courts should employ liability rules
only where the cost of reaching agreement exceeds the benefits associated
with private bargaining. In such circumstances, setting mandatory-access
parameters upon payment of an access fee efficiently incentivizes parties to
forego expensive negotiations and instead to rely on after-the-fact judicial
proceedings.
The FTC's recommendations generally track this policy-based distinc-
tion. For instance, the agency takes aim at the PAE phenomenon, and urges
courts and the ITC to deny injunctive relief and exclusion orders in cases
234. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION,
45-48 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
235. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
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where PAEs bring suit after the defendant has commercialized a technology.
Given the nature of the IT industries in which PAEs are especially active, it
is not always-or even usually-possible for manufacturing companies to
conduct a cost-effective search of the prior art and to bargain for licenses ex
ante. In the presence of preclusive transaction costs, damages are the pre-
ferred remedy, and so the Report is correct to urge courts to decline
injunctive relief in lawsuits brought by PAEs. Furthermore, in calculating an
appropriate measure of damages, the FTC fittingly recommends that courts
focus on the ex ante value of the infringed technology underlying the assert-
ed patent.
Now consider the SSO setting. The process by which industry partici-
pants meet to hammer out a common technological platform for
manufacturing and marketing interoperable goods does not necessarily in-
volve preclusive transaction costs. By definition, the parties have identified
one another and in fact routinely reach agreement on technologically com-
plex issues. One impediment to bargaining might be asymmetric access to
information, especially as to the contents of the various parties' IP portfoli-
os, though the law can encourage disclosure by denying injunctive relief and
curtailing damages in the event of an SSO member's strategically withhold-
ing patents and subsequently enforcing the same following lock in. If
transaction costs in the standards arena are indeed modest, SSOs could read-
ily require IP-holding participants to announce the most restrictive terms
upon which they would demand to license, thus creating a royalty ceiling.
Alternatively, though it would modestly delay the onset of negotiations as to
the technically optimal standard, SSOs could bargain with each patentee to
determine specific royalty terms that would apply in the event that the SSO
incorporates that patentee's technology in the chosen standard.
The benefits of such agreements are self-evident. SSOs, armed with
knowledge not only as to the technical attributes of substitute technologies,
but also as to either the precise or maximum royalties at which they will be
available, could make more informed decisions as to the make up of the best
possible standard. Simultaneously, patentees would agree to license at a
price that reflects competition between rival technologies. The net result
would be an efficient standardization process.
Oddly, this has not occurred. Instead, SSOs have eschewed formal ne-
gotiations over price in advance of selecting a standard. They instead rely on
nebulous, and ultimately ineffective, RAND guarantees as a prophylactic
device against ex post hold up.
Competition laws are partially to blame. SSOs and their members often
fear the legal ramifications of discussing price.2 36 I have argued elsewhere
that antitrust-enforcement agencies should affirmatively relax oversight of
236. See Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards:
The Risk to Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting Organizations, 30 AIPLA
Q.J. 95, 102 (2002).
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these activities. 237 Another probable reason is that engineers, rather than
lawyers or executives, dominate the standard-setting process, and they may
have more interest in figuring out a technological solution than concerning
themselves with such after-the-fact business details as price. Ultimately, it
appears that SSOs and their constituent members have little interest in carry-
ing out royalty negotiations ex ante. No doubt, the perception that an
easy-to-agree-on assurance of RAND licensing is an effective provisional
solution drives this attitude.
Let us return to some basic economic theory. If parties spurn ex ante
negotiations in favor of potential ex post proceedings, despite the presence
of low transaction costs, it is presumably because one or both of the parties
believes that it can obtain a better deal ex post. This is by definition unde-
sirable because inflated or deflated access prices both have negative
effects. In the innovation context, inadequate remedies may deflate incen-
tives to invent, 238 while windfall profits for patentees may attract
inefficiently high levels of investment in the relevant technology. 23 9 It is
unclear whether damages calculated in the presence of RAND assurances
are more likely to over- or under-compensate patentees. One can be confi-
dent, however, that SSOs and prospective licensors would agree on more
socially desirable royalty rates through ex ante negotiations. How could the
law spur these entities to enter into such arrangements before selecting and
locking into a standard? As a matter of economic theory, the solution is to
impose a property rule, thus permitting the owners of infringed technologies
to enjoin others' use if the prospective licensor and the licensee are unable
to reach an agreement ex post.
Many, presumably including the FTC, would rejoin that awarding in-
junctive relief in this manner would facilitate hold out. Even though the use
of a property rule would indeed allow some patentees to extract royalties
that exceed the ex ante economic value of their inventions, critics of a prop-
erty rule would be wrong to treat this as a hold-out situation. By putting
SSOs and those adopting their chosen standards on notice that injunctive
relief will accompany demonstrated infringement, the law would create a
powerful incentive for those entities to bargain as to specific licensing de-
tails ex ante. The situation is at least somewhat comparable to instances of
marginal encroachment over physical land in which the owner of the invad-
237. See Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 217,262-63 (2009).
238. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Diessel, Comment, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the
Emerging Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases
Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REv. 305, 335 n.196, 342 n.239 (2007) (observing that "judicially
determined damages [may] be inadequate to protect innovation incentives").
239. See generally Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Eco-
nomnic Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 390, 405 (1997) (observing that
"supercompensatory damages would encourage parties to overinvest ... in the hopes of ac-
quiring a windfall").
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ed land could obtain an injunction even if the owner's real damages were
small and the encroaching neighbor's harm great. The result in such cases is
an ostensible windfall in favor of the landowner and an apparently draconian
result for the encroacher, but the consequential-and efficient-result is that
future encroachers have a strong incentive to bargain for permission before
the fact.
The distinguishing feature between the encroachment example and the
standard-setting case, of course, is that prospective licensees have received
ex ante RAND assurances in the latter setting. The operative question, there-
fore, is how should the law treat RAND licensing agreements? One answer
is to adopt the FTC's view, which would entail giving those agreements the
greatest possible force under the law. In practice, the most one can do to
bolster the concept of RAND is to treat the assurance as a voluntary aban-
donment of the right to pursue injunctive relief should a dispute arise ex post
as to the meaning of a "reasonable royalty."
There is a cost to this approach, however, which the FTC's Report does
not address. By formally treating a RAND licensing agreement as preclud-
ing the judicial use of a property rule, the law would create a strong
incentive for SSOs to keep doing what they are doing-essentially, to agree
to agree at a future time. By using a liability rule, the law would incentivize
SSOs and their members to reject efficient use of market mechanisms ex
ante.
This might not be so bad if the idea of a "reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory" royalty were at least somewhat determinate, such that courts would be
likely to craft damages awards that accurately mirror the patented technolo-
gy's marginal contribution in value to the end product. Unfortunately,
RAND is a vacuous concept. To the extent that "reasonable" lacks a theoret-
ical foundation, the FTC is correct to point out that the term should be
synonymous with the ex ante value of the relevant technology. 240 Yet, this is
only the start of the battle, for courts face the vexing task of calculating a
reasonable royalty given the specific facts before them. This is unavoidable
in settings where high transaction costs preclude agreement ex ante, but is a
very real cost in situations such as those involving SSOs where the parties
could readily have reached agreement ex ante. Different parties' views of
"reasonableness" are apt to vary, such that potential licensors and licensees
can maintain good-faith positions that are leagues apart.24 1 Resolving those
240. Id.
241. As an illustration, consider the European Commission's action in February 2008 in
fining Microsoft $1.3 billion (then a record in the antitrust world) for charging "unreasonable
prices" for interface information necessary to achieve interoperability with work-group servers.
The offending royalty rate was 3.87% of licensees' product revenues. See Press Release,
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Imposes 6899 Million Penalty on Microsoft for
Non-Compliance with March 2004 Decision (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=1P/08/318.
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differences is not only wholly unpredictable, but also expensive and unlikely
to yield accurate results.
This inaccuracy stems, in part, from the distinct context in which SSO
disputes are likely to arise. Factual findings as to what constitutes a reasona-
ble royalty can be straightforward when a market already exists for the
subject matter in dispute. In those cases, courts can simply look to compara-
ble licenses and use the accompanying royalties as an effective baseline.2 42
In the SSO setting, however, new technologies are typically at issue, which
forecloses judicial appeal to other benchmark licenses for the patented
product or process.
The FTC's recommendation as to RAND, though well intentioned and
indeed desirable if the law could not realistically alter SSO behavior, is mis-
placed. Treating RAND assurances as necessitating judicial use of a liability
rule only will simply perpetuate an inefficient-and wholly unnecessary-
status quo. The Report should instead have looked to the law-and-economics
theory that underlies many of its other recommendations and noted that the
use of a property rule in the SSO setting in the presence of RAND agree-
ments would have two consequential benefits. First, it would induce SSOs to
discard inefficient RAND licensing agreements, which create uncertainty,
impose significant ex post negotiation and litigation costs, and bear the po-
tential to undercompensate patentees. Second, it would spur these entities
either to reach specific agreement as to the terms under which each potential
licensor will make its technology available or, less desirably though perhaps
more realistically, incentivize SSOs to require their IP-holding members to
announce their most restrictive terms ex ante.
In conclusion, it bears emphasizing that there is a crucial difference be-
tween patentees that conceal their IP rights only to assert them ex post, and
those that reveal their claimed technologies ex ante. One can meaningfully
speak of hold out only in the former case. In such settings, it ought to be
axiomatic that courts should deny injunctive relief.
6. Claim Amendment Through the Continuation Process to
Capture a Rival's Product Need Not Be Improper
The FTC takes issue with a staple of the modem prosecution process
that allows an applicant to amend her claims through the continuation pro-
cess to capture a rival's product that she observes in the marketplace. 243 The
242. In practice, difficulties can emerge even in these instances because royalty-
implicating nuances often accompany different license agreements. For instance, the licensed
technology that courts may look to as a baseline may be one of many licenses in a portfolio
and thus difficult to isolate. Alternatively, licensing agreements between the patentee and a
third party may reflect specific tenets of those parties' relationship, which affect the agreed-
upon royalty. Nevertheless, where a market exists for the infringed technology, courts have a
strong reference point for determining "reasonable" damages that approximate the ex ante
value of the claimed product or process.
243. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 124-25.
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FTC is correct to scrutinize the prosecution process-and continuation prac-
tice in particular-because these practices play an important, if unfortunate,
role in the chronic lack of notice generated by the patent system. Continua-
tions enable applicants to extend the prosecution process, adding new claims
as long as the original application's specification adequately supports them.
The longer the prosecution process lasts and the more flexibility inventors
have to alter the nature of their claims, the more likely it is than a third party
will independently invent and market a technology, oblivious to the fact and
nature of the pending patent application.
Perceived abuses of the continuation process have not escaped academic
scrutiny. 2" It might seem odd that the PTO should allow applicants to re-
peatedly change the technology that they claim to have invented, but
continuations can play an important and legitimate role. This is particularly
so in fields involving complex technologies in which a dialog with an exam-
iner may be necessary to arrive at an appropriate level of mutual
understanding. Furthermore, continuations may enable inventors to perfect
the language that best encapsulates the substance of their actual inventions.
For these reasons, simply eliminating the continuation practice is not a fea-
sible solution. Indeed, the PTO's efforts to impose certain limitations aimed
at stamping out some of the worst abuses met an ignominious end when a
federal district court enjoined the PTO's attempted changes.24 5
The Report objects in particular to the practice of using continuations
strategically to broaden "claim language to cover rivals' subsequent devel-
opment of products that the applicant never envisioned when filing the
initial application."24 6 The FTC suggests that this phenomenon is categori-
cally improper, which is a characterization that this Essay agrees with given
the current makeup of patent law. Nevertheless, it need not always be unde-
sirable that an inventor should be able to amend claims through continuation
to capture a rival's product that already exists in the market. It is notoriously
difficult in certain fields for inventors to employ language to accurately en-
capsulate the nature of the invented product or process. Indeed, the doctrine
of equivalents implicitly recognizes this difficulty by specifying that a third
party cannot avoid infringement by designing a product in such a way as to
technically avoid the specific claims of a patent that covers substantially the
same technology.247 There may indeed be situations in which inventors strug-
gle to find appropriate language to describe technologies that they created
following a protracted and expensive R&D process. If such inventors dis-
cover that a rival company has subsequently invented the same technology
244. See, e.g., Lemley & Moore, supra note 222.
245. See Tafas v. Doll, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
246. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 124.
247. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733
(2002).
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but has commercialized it in a way that technically evades the literal claims
pending in front of the PTO, the continuation practice may efficiently enable
the inventor to procure the return envisioned by the patent bargain.
In determining the propriety of amending claims in light of marketed
products, the focus should properly be on the specification. It is that portion
of the application that provides or fails to convey the details of the claimed
invention sufficiently to put third parties on notice.
Unfortunately, and as the Report explains in detail, specifications typi-
cally do not provide the requisite notice to ensure that amended claims
through continuations take place in unobjectionable fashion. The FTC
makes the sensible suggestion that the PTO shift its test from whether the
application provides "adequate support" for the relevant claim to whether,
starting from the specification, a PHOSITA would predict the claim that
later emerges. It is open to question, however, whether such a modest
change will have a sufficient impact to remedy this form of "submarine"
patenting. It may not be sufficient to consistently prevent applicants from
ambushing companies that independently invent and market products that
arguably fall within the ambit of the specification.
The FTC's prescription as to prior-user rights is somewhat more contro-
versial. The agency recommends providing protection to those companies
that (1) infringed patents only due to claim amendment following a continu-
ation and (2) developed the relevant product or process before the amended
claim was published. 248 To the extent that the PTO's processes do not suffi-
ciently apprise third parties of the scope of pending patent applications, such
prior-user rights may be desirable to ensure commercialization of technolo-
gy. Should the PTO subsequently insist that specifications more strongly
support amended claims, however, prior-user rights may prove to be unnec-
essary. Indeed, there may be instances in which applicants should
legitimately be able to alter the language of their claims to capture products
that their rivals have introduced in the market. Fixing the notice deficiency
inherent in the specification may be the first-best fix.
CONCLUSION
The FTC's 2011 Report on patent notice and remedies provides an au-
thoritative treatment on some of the most pressing issues faced by the U.S.
patent regime. The agency's well-founded recommendations promise to de-
liver a series of appreciable improvements in contemporary U.S. innovation
policy. Indeed, such is the importance of this work that it ought to be man-
datory reading for judges, IP academics, examiners, lawmakers, and those
who operate in patent-heavy industries.
248. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 125.
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The FTC's normative conclusions come at an important time, for the pa-
tent system's shortcomings have become increasingly apparent. Economists
generally agree that patents exist to spur the invention and commercializa-
tion of technology that would otherwise be vulnerable to excessive levels of
free riding.24 9 Exclusive rights over the fruits of one's R&D provide a defen-
sible solution to the free rider problem.
To achieve optimal levels of innovation, however, one must do more
than spur isolated instances of private invention. Instead, the law should cre-
ate an infrastructure that fluidly disseminates technology to its highest-value
uses, allowing both those who are best placed to market inventions to con-
sumers and those who enjoy superior opportunities to improve technology
to do so. Low-cost and effective alienation is an indispensable prerequisite
of such a dynamic platform of interconnected innovation. Private rights over
products and processes promise in theory to produce such desirable results
in much the same way that traditional property law creates an efficient sys-
tem of self-regulation in which owners control the use of real and personal
property. Unfortunately, this theory does not translate well into practice on
account of a critical shortcoming of the contemporary patent system-
namely, notice.
Lacking the ability to determine the contours of claimed technology,
overwhelmed by the sheer number of discrete patent-eligible products and
processes in certain fields, and frustrated by overlapping claims to the same
invention, many of today's companies cannot use ex ante technology trans-
fer to license necessary patented inventions. For such entities, the prospect
of a patent-driven, efficient market for the dissemination of technology gives
way to a system that operates as a tax on commercialization. Instead of op-
erating within a patent system that permits companies to identify and pay
royalties for useful technology, many of today's inventors must resort to in-
house R&D. Meanwhile, PAEs acquire patents when the owners have not
developed the claimed technologies to a commercially viable level. In lieu
of advancing these claimed products and processes beyond the threshold
level required for patentability, these PAEs enforce them against companies
that market goods to consumers. This phenomenon creates a patent bubble
that induces many inventors, especially in the IT field, to produce patents
that few will ever read or rely on, and that rarely lead to marketable prod-
ucts.
The Report does an expert job of exploring the many reasons why pa-
tents do not provide appropriate levels of notice and explaining how
remedies play a crucial, complementary role in producing appropriate incen-
tives. The FTC's recommendations are generally laudable and should form a
focal point for ongoing debate and analysis.
249. See, e.g., Bruno Salama & Daniel Benoliel, Pharmaceutical Patent Bargains: The
Brazilian Experience, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633, 685 n.248 (2010).
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In evaluating the Report, however, the principal observation must be
that its ultimate impact on the patent crisis, especially in the IT industry, is
likely to be modest. If courts, the PTO, and Congress were to adopt all of
the FTC's recommendations, the likely result would be only a mild amelio-
ration of the problems that plague the system.
Notice and ex ante technology transfer will continue to challenge the IT
field so long as myriad discrete technologies underlie IT products. Where a
large number of fragmented ownership rights exist over complementary
technologies, ex ante bargaining will be elusive. The FTC's recommenda-
tions cannot change the nature of technology in these industries. Nor is the
Report likely to have a significant effect on the problem of indeterminate
claims. Absent rules limiting a patent's sphere of exclusivity to that dis-
closed in the specification, IT patent claims will remain too vague to make
ex ante bargaining the norm. Unless there is an unforeseen improvement in
the dynamics of patent law in IT industries, it seems probable that more
drastic action will be necessary in the future. In the meantime, policymakers
would benefit greatly from studies devoted to identifying more significant
fixes.
As explored above, property law traditionally responded to high-
transaction-cost environments by employing liability rules that shift
conflicting claims to a resource to an ex post proceeding in which courts set
appropriate access prices. This suggests the propriety of a liability-rule
approach to patent damages in cases in which ex ante bargaining was not
economically feasible. The Report correctly identifies the desirability of
denying injunctive relief in such circumstances, and reminds the courts to
focus on fundamental economic principles in awarding damages so as not to
systemically under- or over-reward patentees.
The 2011 Report sets policymakers in the correct direction. Given the
cabined reach of its recommendations, however, the FTC's most recent
views on the patent system are likely to constitute just one step toward the
ultimate goal of creating a value-maximizing infrastructure in which innova-
tion flourishes.
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